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PRESENTATION
This is the third year that the weekly dispatches 
transmitted during a year, by ECLAC Washington to ECLAC Santiago 
and other subregional offices, are gathered in a single 
document.1
Classified by subject only for their presentation here, the 
dispatches are ordered chronologically within each chapter, with 
each chapter heading revealing the saliency, during the year, of 
certain issues of the international economic agenda. For 
instance, measured by the number of dispatches transmitted, the 
evolution of the world and of the U.S. economy, followed by trade 
and the functioning of the multilateral financial institutions, 
appear prominently. While more distantly behind appear issues 
related to the indebtedness and the adjustment of developing 
countries.
By contrast with previous years, the agenda of 1989 was 
dominated by ’’high politics," in the form of the relaxation of 
what Raymond Aron called the "relationship of major tension" of 
the present international system. By the end of the year, the 
exhilarating evolution of events in Eastern Europe defied 
imagination. Some of the "economic" issues raised by these 
events give ground to optimism, as well as to some appalling 
uncertainties. Among these issues, there is the potential "peace 
dividend" expected to be generated by the relaxation of tension 
among the two superpowers; the conseguences of the integration of 
the Eastern European countries to the world economy; the 
reordering of the process of European economic integration; the 
diversion of development finance from the developing countries to 
Eastern Europe, and so on.
In second place, 1989 saw an intensification of tension due 
to the persistence of imbalances among the major industrial 
powers, particularly in the form of a worrisome increase in the 
frictions between Japan and the United States.
Finally, very distantly behind appeared the indebtedness of 
developing countries, with the debt strategy modified and the 
first cases of implementation taking longer than expected. The 
main event took the form of a fracture within the creditor camp, 
as a result of differences between the commercial banks with the 
U.S. Treasury and the multilateral financial institutions about 
the debt reduction component of the new strategy.
1 ECLAC, International Economic Highlights 1987 (LC/WAS/L.2) 
17 August 1988; International Economic Highlights 1988 
(LC/WAS/L.4) 17 March 1989.
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The purpose of gathering these dispatches in a single 
document is to make them available for easy consultation, in case 
they still have some testimonial value. Finally, unfamiliar 
readers should be reminded that each dispatch tries to remain 
within the self-imposed limit of 750 words, because their 
objective is only to bring to the reader's attention an issue 
that may or may not demand further consideration.
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I. THE WORLD ECONOMY
I. 1. THE PLIGHT OF NON-FUEL COMMODITIES 
(WDW/3/89 - 1 FEBRUARY 1989)
The World Bank announced recently that, in 1988, its 
aggregate index for non-fuel commodities increased to 102.8 
(1979-81=100), a level 10.2 percent higher than in 1987. The 
annual average of the prices of 33 selected commodities 
— excluding petroleum and steel—  stood, by the end of last year, 
at 96.4, an increase of 16.4 percent from the annual average for 
1987, which remained at 80.5, almost the same level attained in 
1985 and 1986.
These figures indicate an interruption in the downward trend 
that has characterized the prices of primary, non-fuel 
commodities, throughout the eighties. The reversal started in 
mid-1987, when the World Bank's current dollar index increased 
from the record low of 74.4 that it had reached in the first 
quarter of the same year.
The last increase in the index amounted to a mini-peak in 
the first quarter of 1984. Primary commodity prices declined 
steadily until the second half of 1987, behavior that, in the 
World Bank's opinion, "proved to be a major disappointment to 
most primary producers."
If annual averages are considered, "the non-fuel commodity 
price index in current dollar terms remained approximately 
constant (at about 80) in all three years— 1985, 1986 and 1987," 
falling to what the World Bank characterized as "record-low 
levels in recent history." Thus, in constant 1985 dollar terms, 
without the sharp increase in beverage prices in 1986, the lowest 
point for the index would have occurred in the same year. Still, 
"the 1987 index was the lowest ever recorded for the series," 
which dates from 1950.
By different commodity groups, between 1984 and 1986, fats 
and oils experienced the steepest decline (45.9 percent), 
followed by cereals (23.5 percent). Industrial raw materials 
— metals and minerals (13.1 percent) and non-food agricultural 
commodities (22.3 percent)—  also attained record lows in 1986, 
while beverage prices remained at relatively high levels, because 
of drought related crop losses in Brazil throughout the 1984-86 
period.
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Two major traits stand-out from the recent price behavior of 
non-fuel commodities. First, the stability at historically low 
levels during the 1985-87 period, as well as the recovery that 
started in the second half of 1987 and that lasted throughout
1988.
Among other aspects of this erratic behavior, the World Bank 
finds "most intriguing" that "the 1984-87 decline in commodity 
prices... happened during a non-recessionary period." On the 
other hand, the reversal in 1987-88 is explained by several 
factors, such as "sustained demand increases, structural 
adjustments within industries that led to sharply reduced
capacity, and perhaps because of the US dollar depreciation in 
the preceding years."
Nonetheless, as the World Bank states in its recent study on 
Price Prospects for Maior Primary Commodities, this upswing may 
not be sustained in the short term. Over the next two years, the 
prices of non-fuel primary commodities "in aggregate nominal 
terms are expected to decline slightly from their 1988 level."
Between 1988 and 1990, the prices of different groups of 
commodities will decrease with divergent intensities. For 
instance, a decline of about 16 percent is expected in the prices 
of metals and minerals, because the present growth rates in 
industrial production will not be maintained. By contrast with 
the prices of cereals, also expected to decline, the forecast for 
the prices of beverages is positive, because coffee and cocoa 
will recuperate from what are termed "the disastrous lows 
experienced in 1988." Besides, the positive outlook for beverages 
is based on the assumption that the prevalent quota schemes will 
remain operational. Finally, the nominal prices of "other foods" 
are also expected to increase, particularly because "the 
international price of sugar in US dollars is expected to 
increase by 35% over the 1988-90 period."
To conclude, the World Bank asserts that "with the 
international inflation index forecast to increase by nearly 8% 
over the 1988-90 period, the non-fuel index in constant US dollar 
terms declines by 10%." This leads to the bleak prospect that 
"such a decline will wipe out the terms-of-trade gains in 1988, 
bringing the constant dollar index back to the record-low level 
of 1987."
The longer term forecasts are equally somber. In real terms, 
the World Bank concludes that non-fuel commodity prices will 
experience "only a modest improvement over the 1990-2000 period 
— increasing by only 5%."
For instance, the foods group price index will "decline even 
further because of substantial declines in the real prices of the 
fats and oils and other foods groups." In the same vein, the
7
price of sugar will "decline significantly over the 1990-2000 
period," because "the sugar market has been and will remain under 
considerable pressure from substitute sweeteners." Beverage 
prices will also "decline even further in real terms over the 
period 1990-1995," because of the "continuing production 
increases from very cost-competitive producers." By contrast, 
"real prices of raw material commodities — agricultural and 
metals/minerals—  should trend up fairly strongly in real terms 
in the 1990-2000 period."
Briefly, the World Bank concludes that "the baseline 
projections for the developing countries present a mixed picture 
for the 1990s. Despite a relatively optimistic outlook for the 
industrial countries, the economic situation in a number of 
developing countries will remain fragile, particularly in the 
medium term, as the trade and payments adjustment in the major 
industrial countries continues to unfold."
Nonetheless, there still is ground for some optimism, 
because "the baseline projection for the industrial countries 
suggests that real GDP growth in this group will accelerate to 
about 3% in the 1990s." Hopefully, this time, these rates of 
expansion will pull-out the prices of non-fuel commodities from 
the slump of the eighties.
I. 2. THE WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. ACCORDING TO THE IMF STAFF 
(WDW/12/89 - 3 MAY 1989)
During the World Bank-IMF Spring meetings, held in 
Washington from March 31 to April 4, the staff of the IMF 
released excerpts of the forthcoming World Economic Outlook. 
Published biannually, the descriptions of developments and 
policies, as well as the projections contained in the Outlook 
should be attributed to the Fund staff.
The contents are divided in four different chapters. The 
first summarizes the overall prospects and the policy issues; the 
second describes the current situation and short-term prospects; 
the third deals with the medium-term prospects and policy issues 
in the industrialized countries; and the fourth addresses the 
medium term prospects and policy issues for the indebted 
developing countries.
Last year's levels of economic activity, illustrate the 
contrasting performances of two different groups of countries. On 
one side, the industrialized countries, as well as a majority of 
Asian countries, exhibited what is considered a surprising 
"buoyancy of growth," that allegedly defied "virtually all 
forecasters." On the other, the developing countries with
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debt-servicing problems, particularly in the Western Hemisphere 
and sub-Saharan Africa, whose economic performance last year — by 
contrast—  was "even weaker than forecast early in 1988, in spite 
of a relatively strong expansion of exports."
This description of world economic performance is followed 
by an analysis of inflation, international monetary developments, 
trade and current account imbalances, financing and debt in 
developing countries, as well as the economic policies followed 
in industrial and developing countries.
The core of the report are the two chapters dedicated to the 
medium-term prospects and policy issues in the industrialized, as 
well as in the indebted developing countries.
The prospects for the industrialized countries are presented 
in the form of baseline projections for the medium term, followed 
by a description of alternative scenarios, as well as by a 
discussion of the main policy challenges.
The baseline projections for the medium term — from 1991 to 
1994—  are based on the assumption that policies will remain 
unchanged, with constant real exchange rates and oil prices. 
Before describing the main conclusions of this exercise, it is 
indicated that "these projections should not be interpreted as 
forecasts, but rather as a technical baseline on the basis of 
which alternative medium-term scenarios can be developed."
From 1991 to 1994, the growth of output in the 
industrialized countries is projected to be moderate, at an 
average annual rate of 3 percent. This projection reflects the 
expectation that growth will be stimulated by the completion of 
the process of internal liberalization within the European 
Community, as well as by the impact of the free trade agreement 
between the United States and Canada.
Based on the assumption that monetary policy will continue 
slowing demand growth, inflation is expected to decline between 
1990 and 1994. Furthermore, the assumption of unchanged policies 
and real exchange rates leads to the conclusion that differences 
in the growth rates of GNP and domestic demand of the three 
largest countries will narrow in 1989-90, with these variables 
projected to grow at broadly similar rates during 1991-94.
Three hypothetical scenarios are drawn from these 
projections. Scenario A depicts a market reaction to unchanged 
policies, since the stability of exchange rates and interest 
rates assumed by the projections is not judged to be consistent 
with the persistence of large current account imbalances among 
the largest industrial countries. Consequently, this scenario 
analyzes the consequences for foreign exchange markets of a shift 
in investors' preferences away from U.S. dollar denominated
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assets. There follows a real effective depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar compensated by a surge in inflation, which in the short 
run leads to an improvement in the competitive position of U.S. 
producers and in the real external balance of the United States. 
The corresponding pressures in U.S. prices are met with 
resistance from the central bank by means of increases in 
interest rates, with the result that growth rates rise initially 
in the United States to end well below the baseline projected by 
1994.
Some of the consequences of this projected scenario are 
particularly harmful for the heavily indebted developing 
countries. As a result of the rise in interest rates in dollar 
denominated assets, the debt-service ratio of these countries 
rises considerably, leading to a cutback in external financing, 
to a compression of imports and to a reduction in output and real 
domestic demand.
Scenario B illustrates the effects of an improvement in the 
federal budget imbalance of the United States, along specified 
limits. The main consequence reflects itself in lower interest 
rates, because of the reduction in government spending. Annual 
growth rates are not markedly different in both scenarios, 
although in scenario B there is sustained improvement in the U.S. 
current account and inflation is much lower than in scenario A. 
Of course, the debt service ratios of indebted developing 
countries are considerably lower.
Scenario C describes the effects of a comprehensive package 
of budgetary and structural measures in the industrial countries. 
Fiscal policies are tightened in the U.S. and efficiency raising 
measures are implemented in other industrial countries, such as 
increased investment in Japan or a tax reform in Canada.
As a result, real GNP increases in 1994 by 1 1/4 and 1 
percent in West Germany and Japan, respectively, as well as 
between 1 1/4 and 1 3/4 percent in Canada, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. The U.S. economy is slightly affected, except for 
lower inflation rates, while output in developing countries is 
somewhat higher at the end of the period. In all, higher growth 
of output and investment, lower inflation and interest rates, as 
well as reduced external imbalances among the three largest 
industrial countries are the main results expected from this 
scenario.
The policy challenge for the industrial countries is "to 
sustain the present expansion while resuming progress toward 
lower inflation and interest rates, reducing the large current 
account imbalances among major countries, and promoting a more 
open international trade environment." These obj ectives are also 
considered important for developing countries.
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Finally, the prospects and policy issues for indebted 
developing countries are centered around an analysis of the debt 
problem. Here are some of the main highlights. First, it is 
recognized that the debt overhang — whereby "the contractual 
value of the country's liabilities exceeds its expected debt 
servicing capacity"—  may act as "a strong disincentive to 
adjustment." This is so, because of "the perception that the 
benefits from improved policies would accrue largely to creditors 
rather than to the country itself." Second, in certain "extreme 
cases,” it is admitted that the debt overhang may become such a 
large disincentive that "debt reduction measures could make both 
debtors and creditors better off." Third, it is also recognized 
that "the size of the external resource transfer may in some 
instances have a direct bearing on the success of domestic reform 
programs."
I. 3. THE WORLD BANK EXAMINES WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
(WDW/20/89 - 28 JUNE 1989)
Embargoed until 5 July, the World Bank recently issued this 
year's World Development Report divided, as usual, in two parts. 
The first part consists of a review, in a single chapter, of 
recent trends in the world economy, as well as of their 
implications for the future prospects of developing countries. 
The subsequent eight chapters contain the special topic of this 
year's REPORT dedicated to the role of financial systems in 
development.
As further evidence of the different tempos at which the 
international economy has been performing during the present 
decade, the Report begins recognizing that "economic performance 
in the 1980s has varied widely among countries and continents."
For instance, "after a sharp recession at the beginning of 
the decade, the industrial countries are well into their seventh 
year of uninterrupted growth," with 1988 characterized as "an 
excellent year for the high-income countries."
Contrastingly, not all the developing countries have taken 
advantage of this "favorable international environment." While 
"most countries of Asia did well, " this was not the case in 
several other parts of the developing world. In Africa, the 
growth rates of many countries "remained near zero," as well as 
in the so-called heavily indebted economies, which "also 
continued to stagnate." Thus, the bleak conclusion is drawn 
that, in the eighties, "in Africa and Latin America hundreds of 
millions of people have seen economic decline and regression 
rather than growth and development."
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The reasons given to explain this blatantly unbalanced 
distribution of growth are that "economies differ greatly in 
their structures, in their domestic development strategies, and 
in the extent to which they have been affected by external 
shocks." The plight of the heavily indebted countries is 
highlighted, because for them "higher real interest rates, 
reduced international capital flows, and lower commodity prices 
have made adjustment both necessary and difficult."
Under the heading of "the international economic environment, 
a brief review reveals that, during the eighties, real interest 
rates "have been higher than at any time since the Great 
Depression." Also, in volume, world trade is said to have 
"increased by more than 9 percent in 1988 — the fastest growth in 
the 1980s." Nonetheless, "high export growth among East Asian 
countries and low export growth in Latin America and Africa have 
significantly changed the regional distribution of developing 
country exports during the 1980s." Finally, the real prices of 
non-fuel commodities have undergone "a prolonged decline," posing 
"short-and long-term adjustment problems for producers and 
consumers alike." By contrast, the prices of oil have experienced 
"massive swings."
These circumstances generate challenges for structural 
adjustment policies. For instance, the "successful adjusters" of 
East Asia are advised "to depend less from external demand," 
while allowing "domestic consumers to reap some of the fruits of 
successful investment in manufacturing."
The "gravest development problems" are found in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where "unfavorable external conditions and inadequate 
policies have caused economic, social and environmental decline." 
Even so, "some adjustment — painfully slow and not always 
sustained—  is occurring," although some African governments are 
said to be reducing their role in the economy. Looking ahead, it 
is considered essential "to correct overvalued exchange rates," 
as well as "to reverse the bias against agriculture."
Nonetheless, in cases where fairly strong economic growth 
has been accomplished, it "has yielded low or negative growth in 
per capita GNP," because of excessive population increase, which 
also "exacerbates the problems of food security, education, 
urbanization, and environment degradation."
After the adoption of drastic measures, the task of 
adjustment in the highly indebted countries, most of them in 
Latin America, is characterized as encompassing "trade reform, 
fiscal and public sector reform, and control of inflation and 
debt."
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Lastly, the centrally planned economies are seen facing "a 
formidable challenge in moving toward decentralized decision 
making and greater reliance on markets."
The Report also identifies the main "development issues" 
that lie ahead. First, poverty, population growth and the 
environment are lumped together. Second, since the "world's 
trading system has become markedly less liberal," protectionism 
is identified as a constant danger. Third, "the debt problem," is 
now subject to a new debt strategy aimed at ensuring that those 
countries that "pursue serious adjustment policies will be able 
to return to growth."
The Report concludes with an analysis of growth prospects 
for the next decade, depicting three alternative scenarios:
1) A positive scenario of "adjustment with growth" assumes 
that the tackling of macroeconomic imbalances "within and among" 
the industrial countries will lead to a fall in real and nominal 
interest rates, while the dollar will depreciate further against 
other hard currencies. Also, those low and middle income 
countries that adopt "structural adjustment policies" will be 
able to "take advantage of growth," while lower interest rates 
will "ease their debt burden." In conclusion, this relatively 
optimistic scenario anticipates that the "combination of 
plausible adjustments by both high-income and low- and 
middle-income governments yields, overall, good prospects for 
world growth through the year 2000." Nonetheless, it is admitted 
that "many low- and middle-income countries would be unlikely to 
achieve the high growth rates they experienced in the 1960s and 
1970s."
A less optimistic alternative is explored in a "low 
scenario." It assumes that "the appropriate policy actions are 
taken neither in the high-income countries nor in certain of the 
low- and middle-income countries." In this case, "crisis is 
averted through continued financing of the imbalances, but the 
low scenario entails great macroeconomic uncertainty, higher real 
and nominal interest rates, increased protectionism, and lower 
growth."
Based on the present debt strategy, the third alternative is 
a "debt reduction scenario." It is characterized by a combination 
of "a reduction in the debt of the highly indebted countries with 
the shift in the macroeconomic policy mix of the industrial 
countries that is part of the adjustment-with-growth scenario." 
It assumes that "debt stocks are reduced by 20 percent over three 
years." This leads to a reduction in net transfers, "in the form
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of Interest payments associated with the reduction in debt 
stocks,w of $5 to $6 billion over the same period. As a result, 
it is estimated that "GDP for the highly indebted countries could 
be about 1 percent higher at the end of the three years."
I. 4. THF RASTTT.T/E SUMMIT (WDW/23/89 - 19 JULY 1989)
With the conspicuous absence of reigning monarchs, the 
leaders of the seven most industrialized nations — Britain, 
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States and West 
Germany—  met in Paris over the weekend, to celebrate what the 
Parisian daily Liberation called "the two-for-the-price-of-one- 
summit-bicentennial."
Besides the six summit participants, President Mitterand 
invited also twenty seven leaders from all over the world, to 
participate in the US$75 million bicentennial celebration of the 
French Revolution. From Africa came Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo, Uganda; Zaire; and Zimbabwe. From Asia came Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan and Philippines. From Europe came Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, and Yugoslavia. Finally, from Latin America came 
Presidents Sarney, Salinas, Sanguinetti, and Perez.
In addition to a spectacular parade and fireworks, as well 
as lavish luncheons and receptions, the summit itself consisted 
of an opening session, held on Friday afternoon, in the new glass 
pyramid designed by the American I.M. Pei, at the main entrance 
of the Louvre Museum, as well as of two working sessions, held on 
Saturday and Sunday at the Arche de la Defense.
The Bastille summit — considered by Secretary Baker, a 
veteran of nine summits, one of the most harmonious ever—  
concluded issuing two statements. The first consisted of a 
political declaration addressing East-West relations, China, 
terrorism and human rights. The second contained an economic 
declaration addressing the international economic situation, 
monetary coordination, trade, development of the poorest and the 
highly indebted countries, the environment, drugs, and 
international cooperation against AIDS. What follows is a summary 
of the main highlights contained in the economic communique.
Three main challenges were identified in the present world 
economic situation. First, adjustment of external imbalances and 
sustained growth, through the promotion of international trade 
and investments. Second, the improvement of the economic 
situation of developing countries, through their further 
integration into the world economy. And third, to safeguard the 
environment for future generations.
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The international economic situation was described as 
positive, although not without risks. Among these last the threat 
of inflation was considered contained, but demanding continued 
vigilance. Also, the momentum of adjustment to external 
imbalances was said to have "recently weakened markedly." Thus, 
while deficit countries were asked to reduce budget deficits and 
increase exports, surplus countries were asked "to contribute to 
sustaining global expansion through policies providing favorable 
conditions for growth of domestic demand and imports." Finally, 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs), exhibiting "substantial 
surpluses," were requested "to contribute to the adjustment of 
external imbalances and the open trade and payments system." To 
this end, the NIEs were asked to "permit exchange rates to 
reflect their competitive position, implement GATT commitments 
and reduce trade barriers."
In the monetary field, it was recognized that international 
coordination has made a positive contribution to world economic 
development and it was expected to continue reflecting economic 
fundamentals. Also, the ninth review of quotas of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was welcomed with a view to its 
completion before the end of the year.
Strong support was granted to the further removal of 
inefficiencies in the industrialized economies, as well as to the 
GATT's dispute settlement procedures and the Uruguay Round. A 
pledge was also made "to oppose the tendency toward 
unilateralism, bilateralism, sectorialism and managed trade." 
Even so, unilateral procedures to open markets, such as the Super 
301 contained in the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, were not even 
mentioned, probably reflecting the presence of a Japanese 
delegation weakened by domestic political scandals.
Development was termed "a shared global challenge," and help 
was offered through opening the world trading system and by 
supporting structural adjustment, as well as by underlining "the 
continuing importance of official development assistance."
The situation of the "poorest countries” was considered 
separately, by pledging support for the efforts of multilateral 
financial institutions for the reduction of debt-service 
payments, for the replenishment of International Development 
Association (IDA) resources, as well as by attaching "great 
importance" to the celebration of the United Nations conference 
on the least developed countries, to be held in Paris in 1990.
Also, separately mentioned was the strengthening of the debt 
strategy for the highly indebted countries, recognizing that the 
following challenges remained: "sound economic policies" in the
debtor countries; "voluntary, market-based debt and debt service 
reduction operations," to complement new lending by creditor 
banks ; support by the IMF and the World Bank to debt reduction
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through policy-based lending; and continued Paris Club 
rescheduling. Finally, in what was afterwards interpreted as a 
blunt warning, the commercial banks were urged "to take realistic 
and constructive approaches in their negotiations with the debtor 
countries and to move promptly to conclude agreements on 
financial packages including debt reduction, debt service 
reduction and new money."
That almost one third of the final economic communique was 
dedicated to the environment led some to call it a "green 
summit." Nonetheless, even before the communique was issued, 
differences appeared among environmental activists about the 
significance of the declaration. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Administrator, William Reilly, thought "terrifically encouraging" 
that "environmental policy is beginning to move from the margins 
to the mainstream of concern." By contrast, environmental 
activists, gathered for a simultaneous meeting in Paris, welcomed 
the extensive treatment given for the first time to the 
environment by the summit, although "they expressed strong 
concern at the seeming slowness to commit resources to the 
problem." Or, as The New York Times briefly sentenced, on the 
environment "the seven were more loquacious than specific."
Receiving extensive treatment for the first time were drug 
related issues. The summitteers pledged "to counter drug 
production, to reduce demand, and to carry forward the fight 
against drug trafficking itself and the laundering of its 
proceeds." Accordingly, the following concrete measures were 
mentioned: to support the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
(UNFDAC); to support an international conference on cocaine and 
drug demand reduction in 1990; to strengthen exchange of
information and cooperation, as well as to conclude bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to stop illicit traffic; and to "convene 
a financial action task force...to assess the results of
cooperation already undertaken in order to prevent the
utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for 
the purpose of money laundering."
Finally, the participants accepted the invitation extended 
by President Bush to meet next year in the United States.
I. 5. THE IMF'S WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (WEOÏ 
(WDW/30/89 - 11 OCTOBER 1989)
The last issue of the WEO, released during the annual 
meetings, contains chapters on the current situation and 
short-term prospects, alternative medium- and long-term scenarios 
and policy issues in industrial countries. It also addresses the 
question of restoring growth in developing countries.
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Among the recent developments in the world economy signs are 
found that "the economic expansion in the industrial countries is 
moderating to more sustainable rates." In the developing 
countries, while some have grown strongly, the weak performance 
exhibited by the heavily indebted and the low-income countries is 
one indicator of the "less satisfactory" side of the world 
economy. Other indicators of dissatisfaction are found in the 
slower "pace of external adjustment among the largest industrial 
countries," as well as in the persistence of high levels of 
unemployment in some European countries.
In the short run, in the industrialized countries, "a 
continued moderation of output growth is expected in the second 
half of 1989 and 1990." Also, assuming the continuation of firm 
policies, inflation will diminish gradually. Even so, such 
moderation is unlikely to turn into "a pronounced cyclical 
downturn," because of the absence of "major cyclical imbalances 
— such as a large inventory overhang or an erosion of profit 
margins—  that typically emerge prior to a recession."
The medium-term baseline projections for the industrial 
countries foresee a moderate rate of growth in output, from 4 1/4 
percent in 1988 to under 3 percent in 1980. During 1990-94, 
output growth will average 3 percent a year and inflation is 
expected to accelerate significantly in 1989, but it will slow in 
the following years.
The alternative medium-term scenarios suggest that 
"considerable costs would be incurred by delaying the reaction of 
monetary policy to an inflationary shock," while action to reduce 
fiscal deficits "would lighten considerably the task of monetary 
policy in resisting inflation."
The darkest cloud in the medium-term outlook is "the 
prospect of sizable and persistent current account imbalances 
among the three largest industrial countries." The persistence of 
these imbalances raises several concerns. First, there is a risk 
of "an explosive spiral or rising interest payments and growing 
external asset and liability positions." Second, "disruptive 
market reactions and exchange rate swings." Third, "where the 
industrial countries are operating at high levels of resource 
utilization," adjustment could have undesirable consequences. 
Finally, there is concern about "pressures to restrict imports 
and limit foreign investment."
Three "major challenges" should be overcome by the economic 
policies of the industrialized countries, for "the long-term 
objective of achieving maximum sustainable growth." First, an 
environment of confidence and stability, without the 
uncertainties and distortions caused by inflation. Second, an 
adequate rate of capital formation, therefore raising the level
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of national saving. And third, to improve the allocation of
resources, by removing "the distortions that hinder the operation 
of market forces."
The chapter on the restoration of growth in developing
countries recognizes that this remains "a particularly urgent 
concern for the international community." After "close to a 
decade of unsatisfactory economic performance," it is "clear that 
considerable additional efforts are required by the indebted 
countries themselves, as well as by the international community."
The meditan term prospects "depend crucially on the balance
of external financing." Even so, the projections "imply the
continuation of a substantial net transfer of resources from the 
debt-problem countries to the rest of the world."
The annual transfer, understood as the balance on goods and 
non-factor services, would still exceed 1 percent of the net 
debtor countries GDP over the 1989-94 period, with the largest 
burden borne by the heavily indebted middle-income countries, 
amounting to 2.3 percent of GDP during the same period.
To achieve such transfers requires "domestic absorption to 
be restrained" to generate the necessary trade surplus. 
Therefore, investment can only recover if there is "a significant 
rise" in domestic saving. Even more so, because "the medium term 
baseline projections envisage only a moderate decline in the net 
resource transfer from debt-problem countries to the rest of the 
world."
Still, as a result of rising export values and continued 
constraints on external borrowing, "debt ratios in the net debtor 
countries are projected to decline gradually, from 163 percent of 
exports of goods and services in 1988 to 116 percent in 1994." 
Already in 1988, for the first time in the last 20 years, a 
"slight decline in the external debt of developing countries" was 
registered. The decline in debt was "most pronounced in the 
Western Hemisphere, where outstanding liabilities to non-official 
creditors fell by almost 6 percent."
Admittedly, this medium-term outlook is "associated with 
considerable risks." Net debtor countries will face more 
difficult prospects in case of a steeper economic slowdown in the 
industrial countries, if world interest rates rise or if there is 
a further deterioration in the terms of trade.
It is also reminded that it was the relationship between the 
debt overhang, the need to reduce the net outward resource 
transfer, and the growth performance of the net debtor countries 
that led to the search for the reduction of the debt and debt
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service burdens. Nonetheless, "in and of itself," debt reduction 
is "no more a panacea for the economic difficulties of the 
indebted developing countries than new lending would be on its 
own. "
Consequently, "substantial additional efforts are required 
both by the indebted countries themselves and by their creditors, 
trading partners, and international organizations."
An overview of the external environment, that goes beyond 
the maintenance of growth in the industrial countries, reveals 
other "less satisfactory" aspects, such as the sharp rise in 
international interest rates, rising protectionism and 
deteriorating terms of trade despite rapid growth in export 
volumes.
Additionally, two elements of the debt strategy are 
considered "most problematic," the external financing situation 
and the continued inadequacy of adjustment efforts. Although it 
is recognized that "the political and social difficulties 
surrounding the sustained implementation of appropriate measures 
will certainly be eased if the sacrifices required can be 
tempered by a reduction in the net transfer of resources to the 
rest of the world, which is particularly heavy for the 
middle-income indebted countries.
I. 6. MOUNTING TENSION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S.
(WDW/33/89) 1 NOVEMBER 1989
As before the first clinch between two sumo wrestlers, the 
economic relations between Japan and the United States are 
becoming acrimonious and are showing ominous signs. The 
interdependence between these two giants has become the relation 
of major tension of the present international economy. Thus, it 
is better to sound the alarm early, before the contenders crash 
against some of the appalled bystanders.
Beyond the mutual accusations of Japanese hostility to 
imports or of U.S. economic mismanagement; beyond the mutual 
recriminations of "unpredictability," as in the case of the FSX 
fighter plane or of the erection of intractable or invisible 
trade barriers; not to mention Super 301 or the stubborn trade 
figures, across the Pacific, voices are being heard that are 
allegedly "poisoning" this fundamental relationship of today's 
international economy.
In the United States, a "revisionist" school offers a 
critical interpretation of Japan's performance that allegedly
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"demonstrates" the inevitability of conflict. In Japan, the 
depiction of the United States as an implacable adversary leads 
to the conclusion that the only alternative left is to break lose 
from a heedless partner.
Gone seem to be the days, in the United States, when the 
accepted wisdom was to imitate Japanese management, productivity, 
thriftiness, solidarity and other so-called "cultural" virtues. 
The "new critics," according to Nr. George Packard, dean of the 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the 
Johns Hopkins University, "seem determined not only to destroy 
the benign image of Japan that has been painted by an earlier 
generation of specialists: They seem to want to destroy the
specialists themselves."
Among the intellectual inspirators of the revisionists 
appears University of California, San Diego, Professor Chalmers 
Johnson's pioneering study of MITI and the Japanese miracle. 
Characterized as a "capitalist developmental state," Japanese 
strength is said to derive from a solid partnership between 
bureaucrats and industrialists, that despite solemn pledges do 
not practice free trade. Also among the inspirators of the new 
school is Mr. Clyde V. Prestowitz, former U.S. trade negotiator 
and author of the celebrated book Trading Places. bitterly 
critical of Japanese trade negotiating tactics.
These works have influenced a group of journalists and 
"hard-line critics" who, allegedly, "dominate American media 
coverage of Japan." For instance, an August Business Week/Harris 
poll revealed that 68 percent of Americans today consider "the 
economic threat from Japan” as more serious than the military 
threat from the Soviet Union.
Among these commentators appears Mr. Karel van Wolferen, a 
Dutch journalist who has lived in Japan for the last twenty 
years, fifteen of them as East Asia correspondent for the Dutch 
newspaper NRC Handelsblad. Mr. van Wolferen is the author of The 
Enigma of Japanese Power, a description of the functioning of the 
Japanese "System" of rule by bureaucrats and corporate 
interests.
Another leading revisionist is Mr. James Fallows, the 
correspondent of The Atlantic monthly, who wrote an article, in 
May 1989, depicting Japan as an adversary that should be 
"contained." In August 1989, in another article, Mr. Fallows 
grouped American experts on Japan in four different categories: 
those who place security above economics; those naive believers 
in free trade; those that are "on the Japanese payroll;" and 
finally, those old-fashioned commentators that do not understand 
the new Japan.
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The revisionists in Japan are just as formidable. First and 
foremost among them appears none other than Mr. Akio Morita, 
founder of the consumer electronics giant SONY and most recently 
the highest bidder in the $3.4 billion purchase of Columbia 
pictures.
Mr. Morita recently co-authored a book with Mr. Shintaro 
Ishihara, a senior Japanese politician who ranked third in the 
last contest to become Prime Minister of Japan. Their book is 
entitled The Japan That Can Sav No and it concludes that "the 
roots of the U.S.-Japan friction lie in the soil of racial
prejudice." Furthermore, Mr. Ishihara recognizes as his mentor, 
General Minoru Genda, the young naval officer responsible for 
planning the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Another revisionist from Japan is Professor Mototada 
Kikkawa, author of an op-ed in The Journal of Commerce urging 
Japan to enact its own Super 301. An "Omnibus Foreign Economic 
Relations Law," containing a "key provision," to adjust capital 
flows in response to U.S. measures against Japan. For example, 
"the imposition of trade sanctions could automatically trigger a
20% slash in Japan's purchases of Treasury notes.” Thus,
Professor Kikkawa concludes, Japan "might never have to 
retaliate, but the law would be available just in case Washington 
launches its Super 301 missiles."
Recently, more serene voices entered the arena. For
instance, Mr. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, participated in a conference on Japanese direct 
investment in the United States, held in Tokyo on October 12,
1989. Focusing on the financial sector and on the basis of "an 
overview of the extent of Japanese presence in U.S. banking," Mr. 
Corrigan concluded that "the stakes for us and for the world 
economy are so very large that we have no choice but to find the 
will and the way that ensures success."
Also, the Managing Director of the IMF, in a speech
delivered to the Japan Society in New York, on October 18, 
concluded that "Japan will want to exert a more active and
positive role — and will be expected by the rest of the world to 
do so."
One week later, Clyde Farnsworth in The New York Times
quoted "American and foreign officials" saying that "behind the
scenes, Japan is positioning Toyoo Gyohten, a well-known official 
in international circles as a candidate to succeed Michel 
Camdessus of France as managing director of the I.M.F."
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II. THE U.S. ECONOMY
II. 1. 1989 LOOKS HOPEFUL (WDW/1/89 - 18 JANUARY 1989)
1988 concluded without major surprises, equivalent to the 
stock market crash of October 1987, which brought forward 
memories of 1929 and opened the door to the specter of recession. 
To the credit of the incumbent Administration, 1988 passed 
without major upsets which could have endangered the victory of 
the Republican candidate in the Presidential elections of 
November. Additionally, the most important external event of 
1988, in the form of the improved relations between the two 
superpowers, also supported a positive outlook for 1989.
This is not to say that what lies ahead is a cloudless 
horizon, because several pending issues could turn upside down 
the most optimistic expectations. For instance, there is the 
question about how the budget and the trade deficits of the 
United States will be confronted. Also, a consensus seems to be 
finally emerging that, unless something is rapidly done, the main 
Latin American debtors are close to the most critical point of 
their fatigue with debt servicing. Still, amidst these 
apprehensions, at least three different factors indicate that in 
1989 there is enough ground for hope.
First of all, a majority of economists agree that there will 
be no recession in 1989. A survey undertaken by Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators, quoted by Leonard Silk in The New York 
Times. indicates that out of 44 economists interrogated about 
present economic prospects, 40 percent do not see a recession, 
until 1991; 27 percent predict the recession will come in 1990; 
and only 33 percent foresee that a recession will start in 1989.
Moreover, the Reagan Administration's assumptions about 
economic prospects, contained in the budget proposal submitted to 
Congress, are more optimistic than those of private forecasters, 
to the point that Hobart Rowen in the Washington Post called them 
"Reagan's last rosy scenario." The President's chief economic 
adviser, Mr. Beryl Sprinkel, predicts the economy will grow at a 
rate of 3.2 percent over the next five years, if and when the 
same policies of steady money growth and limited government will 
continue. Furthermore, when someone recalled that other analysts 
expected lower rates of growth, Mr. Sprinkel replied that he felt 
"pretty confident that there is going to be a lot of egg on their 
faces."
22
Second, the economic team assembled by the incoming 
President is said to constitute a network "based on a brotherhood 
of affluence and patrician credentials," characterized by Peter 
Kilborn in The New York Times "economic agnostics," who call 
themselves "results-oriented." The basic triangle of this network 
is said to be formed by Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of 
the Treasury Brady and Budget Director Darman. The main 
orientation of the triangle is said to be pragmatic, more than 
ideological, more willing to negotiate than to confront.
This pragmatism is considered crucial, because its prime 
test will come soon, in the form of the debate with Congress 
about how to balance the budget, as promised during the campaign, 
without imposing new taxes. The results of this confrontation 
will be closely watched, as the signal that will unleash other 
actions, such as the stance adopted on interest rates by the 
Federal Reserve, which in its turn will influence decisively the 
dollar exchange rate and thus the trade deficit.
Finally, the last upbeat factor giving ground to present 
optimism comes from the domain of "high politics," in the form of 
the relaxation in the relations among the two super-powers, or 
what Raymond Aron used to call "the relationship of major 
tension" of the present international system. The optimism fueled 
by this relaxation derives from the expectation that it will 
translate itself into deep cuts in present military spending on 
both sides of the equation, furnishing the necessary breathing 
space to address internal problems, without demanding more 
burdensome sacrifices. Obviously, the reduction of military 
outlays would allow incoming President Bush to fulfill his 
promise of balancing the budget without new taxes, which in its 
turn would decrease the threat of a financial collapse envisaged 
among professional Cassandras.
To sum up, the consensus, upbeat forecast about the economy, 
added to the pragmatism said to inspire the incoming economic 
team, as well as the impact expected on outlays from the 
relaxation of tensions among the superpowers are the three 
factors which give ground to 1989's hopeful outlook.
II. 2. THE CASE AGAINST THE DECLINISTS 
(WDW/5/89 - 15 FEBRUARY 1989)
Before returning to Stanford University, former Secretary of 
State George Shultz in his valedictory address to the Citizens 
Network for Foreign Affairs, assailed the "false prophets" who 
hold that the United States is in decline, because it is 
overextended.
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These remarks were aimed at the thesis that appears in the 
book by Yale Professor Paul Kennedy, entitled The Rise and Fall 
of Great Powers; Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000» 
The spectacular success of this book, in early 1988, almost 
transformed the proposition that the United States is in decline 
into an issue in the subsequent electoral campaign.
Nonetheless, it was not until the electoral hype wound down 
that serious arguments began to appear against this proposition, 
besides those contained in Secretary Shultz's valedictory.
In the winter 1988/89 issue of the prestigious quarterly 
Foreign Affairs Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington, presents 
the most elaborate argument that has yet appeared against what he 
calls "the declinists."
The "declinist" argument, according to Professor Huntington, 
is based on three core propositions and on three bodies of 
evidence.
The three "core propositions" are: 1) the United States is 
declining economically compared to other market economy 
countries, most notably Japan; 2) a decline in economic power 
eventually affects other dimensions of national power; and 3) the 
relative economic decline of the United States is caused by 
excessive military spending, as a result of what Professor 
Kennedy calls "imperial overstretch."
The present "over-extension" of the United States, according 
to Professor Kennedy, only confirms what is revealed by other 
cases of decline, such as Spain, France and Britain, that have 
taken place in the span of the last five hundred years, "from the 
rise of the western world to the twenty first century."
The "three bodies of evidence" are: 1) the mounting U.S. 
trade and fiscal deficits; 2) the continuing and even 
accelerating declines in U.S. shares of global economic power and 
rates of growth in key areas of economic performance; and 3) 
"systemic weaknesses," such as research and development 
practices, primary and secondary education, production of 
scientists and engineers, as well as savings and investment 
patterns.
Professor Huntington comments on each one of these bodies of 
evidence. First of all, he recalls that the deficits were not "a 
major problem before 1982." He also believes that these deficits 
"stem from the weaknesses, not of the American economy, but of 
Reagan economics." The conclusion is that if the deficits were 
"produced quickly by one set of policies, they can be reversed 
almost as quickly by another set of policies." Hence, "it is a
24
mistake to view them as open sores that will continue to bleed 
away American strength.”
Second, concerning the evidence of "declining shares,” 
Professor Huntington holds that after the rapid decline from 
post-war levels, since 1960, the United States accounts for 22 to 
25 percent of the major forms of global economic activity and has 
done so consistently at least for the last twenty years. 
Consequently, "if hegemony means producing 20 to 25 percent of 
the world product and twice as much as any other individual 
country, American hegemony looks quite secure."
Finally, in relation to "systemic failures," the main threat
to the strength of the United States, for Professor Huntington,
comes from "consumerism, not militarism." He argues against 
Professor Kennedy's assertion that "the burden of empire usually 
becomes onerous when it amounts to ten percent or more of the 
society's product," because it does not apply to U.S. military 
outlays of only six or seven percent of GNP.
But Professor Huntington not only questions the evidence, he 
identifies the "central sources of strength" of the United
States. He finds them in "the competition, mobility and 
immigration characteristic of American society." In his opinion, 
"the ultimate test of a great power is its ability to renew its 
power" and these traits "enable the United States to meet this 
test to a far greater extent than any other great power, past or 
present."
Finally, these internal sources of strength, are
"supplemented by three aspects of the American position in 
international affairs." First, the strength of the United States 
is said to be "peculiarly multidimensional," because it "ranks 
extraordinarily high in almost all the major sources of national 
power." This generates the capability of sustaining "reverses in 
any one arena while maintaining its overall influence stemming 
from other sources." Thus "at present," concludes Professor 
Huntington, "no country can mount a multidimensional challenge to 
the United States, and with one conceivable exception no country 
seems likely to be able to do so in the relevant future."
Second, several structural factors "pull the United States 
into a leadership role in dealing with international problems and 
disputes." Some of these factors are: the geographical distance 
from the major areas of world conflict; a past relatively free of 
overseas imperialism; an antistatist philosophy and a strong 
sense of identification with universal international 
institutions.
Finally, Professor Huntington believes that "no alternative 
hegemonic power, with one possible exception, seems likely to 
emerge in the coming century." For instance, admittedly, the
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Soviet Union still has "the resources, size and military strength 
of a superpower,” but it is also said to have "lost out 
economically, ideologically and diplomatically." Japan is called 
"the choice of the declinists," and it is also dismissed as 
lacking the "size, natural resources, military strength, 
diplomatic affiliates nor, most important, the ideological appeal 
to be a twentieth-century super-power." Only the European 
Community, "if it were to become politically cohesive, would have 
the population, resources, economic wealth, technology and actual 
and potential military strength to be the preeminent power of the 
21st century."
To conclude, Professor Huntington sees some positive 
consequences deriving from what he calls the "fifth wave of 
declinism." The first wave is said to have taken place in 1957 
and 1958, as a result of the Soviet Union launching of the 
Sputnik. The second "declinist surge” came at the end of the 
1960s, in the form of the Nixon-Kissinger announcement of the end 
of the bipolar world and the emergence of a "pentagon of power.” 
The third "declinist scare” occurred after the OPEC oil embargo 
of 1973 and the increase in oil prices. The fourth declinist 
"fear" arrived in the latter 1970s, with the Soviet Union again 
becoming the focus, after "the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, Watergate, 
the expansion of Soviet power." Finally the fifth and last wave 
is said to have been largely triggered "by budget and trade 
deficits and the seeming competitive and financial threat from 
Japan."
For all these reasons, Professor Huntington closes his 
remarks arguing that, after all, "the declinists play an 
indispensable role in preventing what they are predicting," 
because "the more Americans worry about the health of their 
society, the healthier they are." Thus, it is predicted that "the 
current wave will serve a useful historical function if it 
encourages the new president and Congress to take prompt and 
effective actions on the deficits and to inaugurate longer-term 
policies designed to promote saving and investment." This is, 
according to Professor Huntington, "the self-renewing genius of 
American politics,."
As for the debate itself, given the present impossibility of 
verifying its terms — except in what is known among initiates as 
"la longue duree"—  it is better viewed as yet another aspect of 
the traditional rivalry between Harvard and Yale.
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II. 3. THE ECONOMIC STATE OF THE UNION 
(WDW/6/89 - 22 FEBRUARY 1989)
This year's Economic Report of the President constitutes 
"the eighth and final" of the Reagan Administration. It is the 
outgoing President's valedictorian, rather than an expression of 
the incumbent's intentions.
In the message of transmission to the Congress, President 
Reagan compares the situation when he assumed office in 1981 with 
that of eight years later. In his own terms, then, "there was 
widespread doubt concerning the ability and resolve of the United 
States to maintain its economic and political leadership of the 
Free World." By contrast, "today, it is as if the world were born 
anew. Those who doubted the resolve, and resilience, of the 
American people and economy doubt no more. The tide of history, 
which some skeptics saw as ebbing inevitably away from Western 
ideals of freedom of thought, expression, and enterprise, flows 
in our direction."
This assertion is placed in the "historical perspective" of 
the last forty years, singling out that "the prime historical 
reality of this period has been the rivalry between two competing 
political and economic systems." The conclusion drawn from this 
historical exercise is that "today, few doubt which of these 
systems will emerge triumphant," because those "systems that 
emphasized individual initiative, open markets, and personal 
freedoms — as opposed to collective action—  have prospered 
most."
In the rest of the presentation, the President refers to the 
role of government — one of his favorite subjects—  by drawing a 
balance of the past eight years and by describing what are termed 
"the challenges ahead."
First, "the central role of government" is described as to 
nurture the individual genius of man, as opposed to "shackle it 
in a morass of regulations or to tax away the incentives for 
innovation." Nonetheless, the President admits that "this is not 
to deny that there are vital functions that a government must 
perform," although warning that "it must always do so in the 
least intrusive and costly fashion."
Based on this premise, the "Federal Government action should 
be reserved only for those functions that require national 
attention." These functions are: 1) to provide for national
defense; 2) to protect the health and financial security of the 
elderly; and 3) to provide a safety net for the poor. 
Furthermore, "there are some limited circumstances in which 
government regulation of private activity may be beneficial," for 
instance, to protect the water and air from pollution. Finally,
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"the main role of government" is characterized as "to provide a 
stable economic environment that allows each individual to reach 
his or her full potential."
Internationally, the government's role is described as 
"similarly circumspect," with its "primary responsibility" 
described as "to promote sound and stable financial markets that 
encourage international commerce and to reduce barriers to trade 
at home and abroad."
On the last eight years' record, the message first points 
out the main accomplishments. First, "a peacetime economy 
entering an unprecedented 7th year of expansion." Second, this 
has been "accomplished without simultaneously fueling inflation." 
And third, "this record has been achieved not through alchemy, 
but by using that good old-fashioned recipe of reducing the role 
of government."
These successes are also found in the international sphere. 
First, "the strong U.S. recovery, coupled with a weaker recovery 
abroad, helped create a sizable U.S. trade deficit." This "served 
as an excuse for those seeking protection from foreign 
competition." Second, protectionism is chastised "like most forms 
of government intervention in the economy," because "it serves 
only to enrich the few at the expense of the many."
Based on these assertions, the main accomplishment in the 
international sphere is described as to "have successfully 
resisted this protectionist pressure, while pursuing major trade 
liberalization efforts abroad."
Among the remaining challenges, the "first and foremost" is 
defined as "to reform the budget process and to bring Federal 
spending under control." Additionally, "there is still work to be 
done" about inflation. Finally, "the challenge for the future is 
to maintain and expand upon the progress ... in taking economic 
decisions away from the government and returning them to the
private sector, where they properly belong."
In conclusion, the President describes his mandate as a 
"second American revolution," that "in eight short years," 
reversed the "50-year trend of turning to the government for 
solutions." This message is also said to have "inspired changes 
throughout the world."
Finally, in his usual upbeat style, President Reagan closes 
asserting, "I leave office secure in the knowledge that these 
policies have worked, and confident that this great Nation will
continue to lead the way toward freedom and prosperity for all
mankind."
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The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers itself 
comprises the following seven chapters: I) free markets,
stability and economic growth; II) fiscal policy and economic 
expansion; III) growth and evolution of international capital 
markets; IV) world trade and economic growth; V) rethinking 
regulation; VI) science, technology and the U.S. economy; and 
VII) the U.S. economy in the 1980s and beyond.
Here are some of the highlights contained in the Report. 
The first chapter concludes that "the lessons of the past 
suggest that solutions to economic and social problems should 
place maximum reliance on free markets." Even so, "government 
has a role in providing a stable macroeconomic environment, 
encouraging free trade and investment, providing basic public 
goods and a social safety net."
The examination of the role of fiscal policy in economic 
expansion concludes that "the Nation must avoid the temptation to 
increase marginal tax rates to reduce the Federal budget 
deficit."
The evolution of international capital markets contains a 
section dedicated to "the debt of developing nations," that does 
not offer new proposals to overcome this problem.
The agenda for the future of international trade recognizes 
the existence of a "tendency toward bilateralism," whose 
manifestations are not in themselves necessarily judged as 
"negative factors." The conclusion is drawn that "whether 
bilateral or multilateral liberalization will prevail depends 
significantly on two major events: the outcome of EC integration, 
scheduled to be completed by 1992, and the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round GATT negotiations, scheduled to end in 1990."
The fifth chapter describes the lessons and challenges of 
government regulation in a way that deserves full quotation. The 
lesson is that "regulation should be applied judiciously." The 
challenge is "to design institutions that create incentives for 
private market solutions to address problems, such as pollution, 
that can arise as a result of marketplace activity."
On the role of science and technology (S&T), "major changes 
in the role of the Federal Government do not appear to be 
needed." What is required is to improve the "understanding of the 
factors — institutional relationships as well as incentives—  
that determine how effectively the S&T system works."
Finally, the last chapter projects an average annual rate of 
growth of real GNP of around 3 percent until 1994.
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II. 4. SETTING THE INTER-AMERICAN AGENDA 
(WDW/7/89 - 1 MARCH 1989)
The prestigious Inter-American Dialogue has issued its fifth 
report on the state and the future of hemispheric relations. In 
its own terms, this is the "most succinct and action oriented" of
these reports and the timing for its release is also most
appropriate.
On the agenda's top, the Dialogue urges the adoption of
actions "to reduce Latin America's debt as an indispensable step 
toward reviving the region's economies." Otherwise, "if Latin 
America's perilously deep and prolonged depression is not ended 
soon, the consequences will be disastrous."
In second place appears Central America, where the new 
Administration is urged to "move promptly to support the efforts 
of Central America's presidents to forge a secure peace."
Third, the drug trade needs to be "vigorously fought 
throughout the Americas," with Inter-American cooperation 
"urgently needed to identify which approaches work best to 
reduce demand and supply and to avoid damaging friction over
drugs."
Fourth, the democratic governments of the Hemisphere are 
called upon to work together to strengthen democracy, which is 
said to be "at grave risk" in Latin America.
Fifth, remedial and preventive actions are urged in a 
concerted manner from all the governments "to halt environmental 
degradation throughout the Hemisphere."
Finally, "Inter-American cooperation" is said to be both 
"necessary and achievable," because "ideological approaches have 
given way in the 1980s to a new pragmatism."
The ordering of the elements of this proposed agenda for 
action sharply contrasts with the salient issues that 
predominated during the past year. As surveyed by Margaret Daly 
Hayes, in the last issue of Foreign Affairs. America and the 
World 1988/89, four issues prevailed in last year's agenda of 
Inter-American relations. First, "Nicaragua and the U.S. support 
for the contras;" second, "Panama and the effort to oust General 
Manuel Antonio Noriega;" third, "drug trafficking;" and fourth, 
"the persistent debt problem." Also, "beyond these headlines," 
there was the continued "struggle to institutionalize democracy 
and modernize economies."
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In the end, the priorities that will prevail in the future 
depend on the new Administration, which still finds itself 
involved in the process of appointing the persons charged with 
putting into practice what is recognized as a more pragmatic 
foreign policy stance.
Until now, discussions about Inter-American relations have 
centered around the person chosen to occupy the position vacated 
by Mr. Elliot Abrams, as Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, the highest ranking position in charge of 
Hemispheric relations.
The Secretary of State, in search for a bipartisan approach, 
has chosen a Democrat, Mr. Bernard W. Aronson, for this position. 
During the Carter Administration, Mr. Aronson worked as a special 
assistant and speech-writer for Vice President Walter Móndale. 
Also, from 1981 to 1983 he was director of policy for the 
Democratic National Committee. Moreover, the main reason invoked 
for his selection is the role played by Mr. Aronson in drafting 
the speech made by President Reagan, on June 24, 1986, requesting 
military assistance to oppose the government of Nicaragua. Mr. 
Aronson is credited with helping then President Reagan to obtain 
the support of several Democratic votes for the approval by 
Congress of such military assistance.
For this reason, reportedly, Secretary of State James Baker 
III "concluded that Aronson's background would help him reconcile 
the disputes that split Democrats and Republicans during the 
Reagan administration."
Even so, the choice of Mr. Aronson has been criticized by 
some liberal Democrats, as well as by centrist and conservative 
Republicans. For instance, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode 
Island) declared "if you look at his record, he doesn't seem to 
have all that much background." By contrast, when asked if the 
selection of Mr. Aronson was a good decision, Senator Bill 
Bradley (D-New Jersey) declared: "among the alternatives I've
heard, I think it is."
Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas) declared: "I'm sure he is 
a very quick study, but my disappointment is that he just doesn't 
seem to be someone who has a broad background and a sense of the 
history of the region, and he doesn't speak the language." Also, 
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) reportedly "expressed concern 
that, aside from his Central American involvement, Aronson has no 
experience with such regional issues as the debt problems of 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and other major Latin American 
countries." Last but not least, aides to Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-North Carolina) have "expressed concern about the selection," 
because "Mr Aronson seemed to have little knowledge of or 
experience in South America."
Consequently, the controversy surrounding Mr. Aronson's 
appointment, in fact, has to do with the issue that should appear 
at the top of the hemispheric agenda. Briefly, on one side appear 
those who see the wider issue of debt and economic depression as 
the primary concern. On the other appear those who want Central 
America to remain as the top item.
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II. 5. MANAGING A $5 TRILLION ECONOMY 
(WDW/18/89 - 14 JUNE 1989)
The debate about the budget deficit in the United States has 
generated several proposals about the management of the economy. 
Probably one of the most original has been presented in the book 
Governing The $5 Trillion Economy (Oxford University Press, 
1989). The author of this book is Mr. Herbert Stein, a 
prestigious, mildly conservative, and one of the wittiest that 
can be found among Republican economists.
The debate about the federal budget deficit is characterized 
by Mr. Stein as "defeatist and escapist," because "it despairs 
about making rational, informed choices through the political 
process." Also, because it tries "to bypass that process," by 
means of "freezes, across-the-board expenditure cuts, or 
constitutional amendments."
The budgetary debate is characterized as a clash of 
contending arguments that is considered essential to modern 
budgeting, understood as the "process of allocating scarce 
resources among competing uses."
These debates were useful when the size of federal 
operations was relatively small, affecting only insignificant 
aspects of the economy's overall performance. Mr. Stein recalls 
that in 1929 federal expenditures were 3 percent of GNP, mostly 
for defense, veterans' benefits and interest on the war debt. 
Also, in 1948, federal expenditures were 12 percent of GNP, with 
expenditures outside traditional areas, such as defense, 
veterans' benefits, interest, international affairs, 
administration of justice, and general administration, 
representing less than 2 percent of GNP. This changed radically 
in the sixties and seventies, when the federal government moved 
into new fields, such as health, education and assistance for the 
poor. For instance, in 1978, "federal expenditures outside the 
traditional areas were 13 percent of GNP, whereas traditional 
expenditures were only eight percent." In 1988, in a more than 
$5 trillion economy, federal expenditures amounting to $1 
trillion represented almost one fourth of the national output.
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Given this impressive growth in federal outlays and thus of 
the relative importance of government in the overall economy, Mr. 
Stein derives the conclusion that one of the responses to this 
transformation should be to change the terms of the budgetary 
process.
The federal government's decisive influence on the 
allocation of the national income is exercised not only through 
budgetary outlays, but also through regulations, taxes, lending 
programs, and so forth. Consequently, Mr. Stein proposes that the 
budgetary process be changed to achieve a better allocation of 
the national output, in what amounts to a process of so-called 
"budgeting the GNP."
Three major advantages justify this change toward "looking 
at the budgetary problem as one of budgeting the GNP."
First, pondering federal expenditures in the context of 
total output, instead of comparing them with other budgetary 
items, means that a "bridge" is established between national 
objectives and budgetary decisions. Because choices should be 
made among ends — such as investment or consumption—  rather than 
among instruments — such as taxes or deficits.
Second, by definition, budgetary decisions involve 
sacrificing some objectives with the aim of attaining others. In 
GNP terms, more of one objective entails less of another one, 
instead of the illusion that everyone's aims can be met without 
sacrifices, "just by increasing the budget."
Finally, the allocation of GNP allows for a widening of the 
choices, by focusing on other non-budgetary measures, through 
which the government also exercises influence upon the economy.
On the basis of these considerations, the proposal for 
"budgeting the GNP" contains three elements:
- a statement from the President on national objectives;
- the allocation of the national output among these 
obj ectives; and
- a list of programs to achieve the proposed allocations.
The President's statement should be based explicitly on a 
perception of "the nation's chief problems and objectives." To 
arrive at this perception, Mr. Stein suggests the use of a 
technique from defense decision-making, called "net assessment," 
by which experts appraise the situation and how it can be 
changed.
The categories into which the national output is broken down 
"depend on the chosen objectives." Mr. Stein, for instance, 
proposes the following: defense, education, consumption,
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investment and other government. Admittedly, "the selection of 
these categories is itself a judgment about what the major 
national issues are," because there is no agreement about a 
"functional" classification of GNP.
Even so, it is considered more difficult to evaluate the 
impact of the proposed changes on the allocation of the national 
output. For instance, much work has been dedicated "to estimating 
the consequences of various tax changes on savings, consumption, 
investment, and economic growth." While less work exists about 
the "incidence" of budgetary expenditures.
Finally, it is proposed that the objectives to guide the 
allocations of GNP should be contained in a four year program, or 
budgetary framework, within which proposed appropriations would 
be made every two years.
To conclude, Mr. Stein denies that the proposal is aimed at 
overcoming the inefficiencies that emanate from "the fact" that 
budget-making is an essentially political activity. In his own 
terms, budgeting is "an adversary process, like war," whereby "it 
is assumed that the participants will try to cheat, to evade 
their commitments, to disguise their intentions, and to limit the 
options of their adversaries." Consequently, instead of changing 
the nature of the confrontation, the proposal aims realistically 
at changing "the terms of the struggle," by raising "the 
decision-making level to a point where more people can see their 
interests and be informed."
The purpose is thus defined as to displace the debate from 
the ideological domain, that usually prevails in discussions 
about taxes, deficits, or the size of government, to the more 
pragmatic domain, where the concerns refer to the alternative 
uses of limited resources, such as reducing investment to 
increase consumption, or the perennial alternative between guns 
and butter. As succinctly stated, the purpose of the proposed 
reform is "to face the fact that there is no free lunch."
Finally, those who react skeptically, by saying "that's 
planning," are forewarned that the proposal does not include an 
increase in the powers and responsibilities of government. It 
only tries to deal with "the fact that the federal government is 
going to be very big" and that Mr. Stein would like "to see it be 
better," because public policy improvement requires "more 
informed, objective, and honest discussion" in the private 
sector.
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II. 6. ADJUSTMENT WITH GROWTH IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
(WDW/24/89 - 26 JULY 1989)
The main question raised in the seventy-fourth annual report 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) is how the 
U.S.economy can be adjusted "in an environment of continuing 
economic growth abroad and financial stability in the world 
economy" (WDW/22/89). "After all, a nation cannot spend more than 
it produces forever."
In macroeconomic terms, for the FRBNY, the U.S. external 
imbalance is a reflection of overspending on consumption and 
undersaving/underinvestment in the economy. Also, as the result 
of three "technically equivalent" gaps — the export-import gap 
the output-spending gap and the saving-investment gap—  
adjustment entails the reversal of these underlying macroeconomic 
forces.
Three "compelling reasons" explain the need for adjustment. 
First of all, "a disturbing sharp decline in the level of net 
investment relative to GNP" has to be stopped and reversed. This 
must be accomplished in a context in which "investment is 
financed from domestic sources instead of capital inflows from 
abroad." Therefore, overspending on consumption must be curbed, 
while the level of national saving must be raised.
The second reason has to do with one of the major risks 
posed by the persistence of the external deficit, seen as 
"ultimately centered on falling dollar confidence." In the United 
States, foreign capital inflows have become decisive "to maintain 
orderly conditions in foreign exchange, money and capital 
markets." Thus, the unwillingness of foreign investors to 
increase their dollar holdings, in case of a loss of confidence, 
could have staggering consequences on the dollar and on domestic 
interest rates.
Finally, the third reason is that "a continued 
spending-output gap is a significant threat to price stability." 
Until now, idle capacity utilization and moderate price increases 
account for the fact that overspending has not resulted in an 
acceleration of U.S. inflation. Even so, "to avoid inflationary 
pressures, the domestic output-spending gap must be reduced by 
lowering spending and not by increasing output."
Focusing on these underlying macroeconomic forces leads to 
the conclusion that "the external deficit cannot be reversed 
immediately." The medium term, or five years, are considered "a 
more realistic and concrete target," if and when certain 
conditions are met.
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First, exports must grow more rapidly than imports, with the 
bulk coming from manufacturing, which requires "a significant 
shift in resources." Second, to deal with the domestic 
spending-output gap, "consumption and government expenditures 
must grow much more slowly than in the recent past and must 
decline relative to GNP." Third, if the foreign savings inflow 
falls, the saving-investment gap must be closed with "increases 
in private saving and/or reductions in the public sector 
deficit." Fourth, foreign domestic spending must grow faster, 
making surplus trading partners "match the decline" in the U.S. 
deficit.
In other terms, the three gaps must be confronted 
simultaneously, with the reduction of the federal budget deficit 
judged as the most "appropriate U.S. macroeconomic policy 
response." The aim of such reduction should be to shift resources 
into investment spending by lowering public and private 
expenditures.
This poses the question of what is the appropriate policy 
mix to carry out this needed shift in resources, from consumption 
into savings, investment and the international trade sector. 
First of all, fiscal measures to reduce the federal budget 
deficit may either cut directly the share of government spending 
on goods and services, or raise taxes and/or reduce government 
transfer payments, reducing private spending.
Second, monetary policy must "aim at avoiding inflationary 
overheating," although by itself it cannot increase savings or 
switch resources. Additionally, the dollar exchange rate will 
depend on factors such as domestic external inflation, relative 
productivity performance and perceptions of expected results. 
Consequently, "combinations of monetary policy and exchange rate 
changes will simply not produce a satisfactory adjustment." On 
the contrary, drops in the dollar exchange rate can feed 
inflationary expectations and push up interest rates, affecting 
levels of domestic investment.
As a counterpart to the U.S. adjustment effort, surplus 
trading partners are expected to compensate for the corresponding 
reduction in their surpluses with sufficient domestic demand 
expansion, "to maintain a sustainable pace of overall 
noninflationary economic growth." This is also expected to 
"reduce the risk to the stability of financial markets and the 
world economy."
Finally, commercial policy measures aimed at opening markets 
abroad are expected to produce results that are judged "modest in 
economic terms," because they will not deal with "domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances." Even so, it is recognized that 
commercial policy can make a large contribution "to contain 
protectionist tendencies" in the U.S.
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To summarize, the FRBNY concludes that "to count on private 
forces to shift a large amount of resources smoothly from 
consumption into saving, investment and the international sector 
seems impractical.” What is required is "a credible plan to 
eliminate the budget deficit over the next four years." 
Otherwise, as depicted by Marina v.N. Whitman, "the risk of a 
market enforced 'hard landing' cannot be ruled out.”
II. 7. HERALDING THE MILLENNIUM (WDW/25/89 - 6 SEPTEMBER 1989)
Besides the scandals that usually fail to awake Washington
during the summer and that whither away after Labor Day, the 
capital's foreign policy establishment has been aroused by non 
other than by Hegel's World Spirit. This time, it came embodied 
in an article published in the summer issue of The National
Interest. a mildly conservative quarterly journal, created not so 
long ago as an alternative to the more traditional Foreign 
Affairs and to the more liberal Foreign Policy.
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the excitement generated 
by this article is because it was written by Mr. Francis
Fukuyama, who presently is the Deputy Director of the State 
Department's policy planning staff. As Hegel announced in 1806, 
after Napoleon defeated Prussia in the Battle of Jena, Mr. 
Fukuyama entitles his article "The End of History?" and holds 
that, in 1989, this well known Hegelian question can be answered 
affirmatively.
To anybody who claims nowadays that he is "Hegelian," it is 
always good to ask the question what kind of Hegelian, given the 
very diverse interpretations that are available of the Prussian 
philosopher's work. Mr. Fukuyama recognizes that his 
interpretation of Hegel is that of Alexandre Ko j eve, the well 
known Russian emigre who in the 1930s taught in Paris, at the 
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Kojeve's influence was such 
that among his students were Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul Sartre, 
two of the foremost representatives of the Parisian, contemporary 
intellectual landscape.
To summarize it very briefly, Mr. Fukuyama claims that 
"something fundamental has happened in world history." In his 
opinion, this is "not just the passing of a particular period of 
postwar history," but "it may be the end of history," understood 
as "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution," in the 
form of "the emergence of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government." For Mr. Fukuyama, "the century that 
began full of self confidence in the ultimate triumph of liberal
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democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where 
it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between 
capitalism and socialism, but to an unabashed victory of economic 
and political liberalism."
Two "major challenges" have been confronted successfully by 
liberalism in the present century: fascism and communism. In Mr. 
Fukuyama's terms, "fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by 
World War II," because "expansionist ultra-nationalism, with its 
promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous defeat, was no 
longer viable either as a political movement or as an idea."
What he terms "the other great alternative to liberalism" is 
communism, which admittedly posed a "far more serious challenge." 
Even so, "as a result of the receding of the class issue, the 
appeal of communism in the Western world, it is safe to say, is 
lower today than at any time since the end of World War I."
But it is in the "non-European world" that Mr. Fukuyama 
finds "the occurrence of major ideological transformations." He 
mentions as the "most remarkable examples" those of Asia, such as 
Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Although he claims 
that "the power of the liberal idea would seem much less 
impressive if it had not infected the largest and oldest culture 
in Asia, China." What is important is that "the People's Republic 
of China can no longer act as a beacon for illiberal forces 
around the world, whether guerrillas or middle class students." 
Also, recent developments in the Soviet Union are deemed "the 
final nail into Marxism-Leninism's coffin."
Having reviewed the fate of these challenges to liberalism, 
Mr. Fukuyama concludes that "at the end of history i: is not 
necessary that all societies become successful liberal 
societies." What is important is "that they end their ideological 
pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human 
society."
Asserting that "the fascist and communist challenges to 
liberalism are dead," Mr. Fukuyama asks if there are "any other 
ideological competitors left?" He identifies religion and 
nationalism, but dismisses them promptly. In the case of 
religion, because beyond the contemporary world of Islam "the 
doctrine has little appeal to non-Muslims, and it is hard to 
believe that the movement will take on any universal 
significance." In the case of nationalism, Mr. Fukuyama considers 
that it does not represent "an irreconcilable contradiction in 
the heart of liberalism." Consequently, he does not see any clear 
challenges in sight to the reign of liberalism.
Having dismissed these remaining challenges, Mr. Fukuyama 
describes the implications of "the end of history for 
international relations." They will be characterized by what is
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called "Common Marketization," which consists of "the diminution 
of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states." 
Admittedly, there still will be conflicts, "for the world at 
that point would be divided between a part that was historical 
and a part that was post-historical."
The only complication Mr. Fukuyama anticipates is that "the 
end of history will be a sad time,” and it is here that his 
perspective becomes millenarian. Because he holds that, "at the 
end of history," what will come are "centuries of boredom."
The excitement generated by Mr. Fukuyama's article can be 
understood, because of the provocative nature of his assertions. 
To conclude, an observation made by one of those asked to comment 
Mr. Fukuyama's article is of interest here. Mr. Irving Kristol, a 
leading neo-conservative, said: "we may have won the Cold War, 
which is nice— it's more than nice, it's wonderful. But this 
means that now the enemy is us."
II. 8. THE SCARE OF FRIDAY THE 13TH 
(WDW/32/89 - 25 OCTOBER 1989)
Once again, it was Friday afternoon in October, only this 
time it was Friday the 13th. In the last hour of trading, the Dow 
Jones Industrial average lost 150.9 points, or 6.9 percent, its 
second steepest fall, exceeded only by the 508 point drop of 
Monday, October 19, 1987. Although in percentage terms, the
decline was only the 12th worst, more terrifying was the speed of 
the dive, amounting to 154 points in 65 minutes. The stock market 
was left "holding its breath," over the weekend, as many believed 
it had to brace for another "Black Monday."
When the market opened, on Monday, with a loss of more than 
sixty points in the first hour, it appeared as if history could 
repeat itself. But the Dow Jones turned around to close, with a 
"big sigh of relief," 88.1 points above the fearful finale of 
Friday the 13th. Thus, with hindsight, the scare became a "sharp 
correction," instead of the anticipated "calamity."
Several factors were singled out to make some sense out of 
this erratic and frightening behavior. For instance, there was 
consensus that the immediate cause of the plunge was the collapse 
of the take-over of United Airlines' parent company UAL, because 
the bidders were unable to secure enough financing.
This denouement was interpreted as the last of several 
signals indicating the end of "the take-over era," that fueled 
some of the most spectacular gains in the stock market. Investors 
apparently interpreted the collapse of the UAL deal as an
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indicator that financing would no longer be easily available for 
such deals, thus they rushed to sell their take-over related 
stocks.
In its turn, these panic sales of take-over stocks unleashed 
a wave of selling of large volumes of non take-over stocks, 
because in the afternoon computer driven "program trading" 
triggered sales of baskets of stocks by many large investors, 
such as pension funds.
Even so, The Wall Street Journal editorialized, "the 
consensus seems almost as wide that one faltering bid is no 
reason to write down the value of all U.S. business." Thus, it 
turned towards a more political explanation, identifying another 
"piece of news" as the culprit. Just "an hour before Friday's 
plunge," the Journal recalled, the Senate Democrats succeeded 
"in stalling the capital gains tax cut," proposed by the 
Republican Administration.
In the same vein, the neo-conservative economist Jude 
Wanniski wrote, also in the Journal. that on Friday the 13th he 
called Senator Bradley (D-New Jersey) to "cheerfully inform him 
that he and his fellow Democrats were to blame" for the plunge. 
After all, said Mr. Wanniski, the stock market represents "the 
collective expectations about the value of the future income 
stream of the nation's capital stock, discounted to present 
value." For this reason, Mr. Wanniski concluded, "the struggle 
over capital gains is the most important game in town, in 
Washington and on Wall Street," the UAL deal was "a flea," while 
the setback to capital gains was "an elephant rumbling through 
Wall Street."
Other explanations pointed to some recent changes in the 
structure of the market, rising interest rates abroad and the 
confrontation between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve about 
the dollar exchange rate.
Changes in the structure of the market have, allegedly, 
transformed its primary goal of instrument for raising capital 
for public companies. For instance, with the emergence of stock 
futures, trading has become an end in itself. For the former 
chairman of Merrill Lynch and former Secretary of the Treasury, 
Donald Regan, the stock market has become "more like a commodity 
auction market, bringing the frenzied buying and selling and wild 
price swings." Hobart Rowen made this point more graphically, in 
his weekly column in the Post saying that "the stock market has 
become a casino."
Others, as Floyd Norris in The New York Times. suggested 
that recent interest rate increases in Japan, West Germany and 
Great Britain were to blame, because the slowdown that higher 
interest rates will provoke will "reduce the demands of those
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countries for American goods, thus cutting profits of American 
companies and increasing the United States trade deficit even if 
the dollar also drops in value."
The tension between the Treasury and the Fed over the value 
of the dollar was also blamed. Nonetheless, optimists thought the 
plunge might end up being "good news for the economy," because 
"in one wild hour of trading, the market managed to accomplish 
what the Bush administration has been trying to do, 
unsuccessfully, for weeks. It is forcing the Federal Reserve to 
ease its grip on credit and by taking the wind out of a 
previously irrepressible dollar. The resulting decline in
interest rates and the value of the dollar could reinvigorate 
American business — indeed, the entire economy."
Be it as it may, as The Washington Post editorialized, the 
market's fall was stopped by the interplay of two factors. First, 
the "skillful intervention" of the Federal Reserve, to steady 
interest rates and to provide liquidity. And second, "pure good 
luck,” because the fall had taken place during the last hour of 
trading, on Friday, giving "everybody time to think" over the 
weekend. The question is how long will the Federal Reserve and 
good luck succeed in "insulating the economy from the shock of a 
falling market."
It used to be that "the market" served as an indicator of 
the economy's health. The crash of 1987 revealed that, contrary
to "common wisdom," the market may plunge without major
consequences for overall employment or income. No wonder, Steven
Pearlstein in the Post asserted that "The Market" has become "an 
amalgam of contradictions that defies logic or simple explanation 
and almost always eludes prediction.”
Still, one of the few remaining certainties is that when 
"The Market" suddenly plummets it invariably cries for government 
intervention. But when "normalcy" returns, in the form of 
sustained gains, "The Market" prefers to be left alone.
41
III. TRADE
III. 1. THE U.S.-JAPAN TRADE IMBALANCE 
(WDW/8/89 - 8 MARCH 1989)
The private sector Advisory Comnittee for Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (ACTPN), created by the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 
recently presented the results of a one year review of U.S. trade 
relations with Japan. The study was carried out by the ACTPN*s 
Japan Task Force, composed of 45 representatives of some of the 
leading corporations, trade groups and labor organizations from 
the agricultural, industrial and service sectors of the United 
States.
The report's title is Analysis of the U.S. - Japan TRade 
Problem (February 1989). It contains six chapters: 1) the
problem; 2) the U.S. macroeconomic problem - the budget deficit;
3) Japan's macroeconomic problem -excessive saving; 4) impact of 
macroeconomic policy adjustments on the bilateral trade
imbalance; 5) the role of Japanese trade barriers; and 6) lessons 
from the Administration's experience with Japan.
The results are presented in two sections. First, an
analysis of the main causes of the present imbalance. And second, 
a set of recommendations for the attainment of "meaningful 
results without unnecessarily straining the relationship."
The task force recognizes that the bilateral trade deficit 
between the U.S. and Japan "remains frustratingly high," at an 
expected $55 billion in 1988, compared to $59.8 billion in 1987. 
It also identifies the factors responsible for what it calls 
"this stubbornly resilient deficit," that accounts for almost one 
third of the U.S. global trade imbalance.
On the side of the United States, macroeconomic policies 
have led to: 1) "a shortfall in U.S. saving relative to
investment (equal to 3.5 percent of GDP at its peak in 1986)
which raised real U.S. interest rates;" 2) "the tremendous inflow 
of freely available foreign capital, particularly from Japan, to 
make up the shortfall in saving, an inflow which raised the real 
value of the dollar;" and 3) "faster U.S. economic growth in the 
early 1980's than in the rest of the industrialized world, which 
attracted imports." The single most important cause of this 
"historic decline in the personal saving rate" of the United 
States is found in the U.S. federal budget deficit.
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On the side of Japan, macroeconomic policies are also blamed 
for the generation of the "excess national saving that has flowed 
to the United States, depressing the yen relative to the dollar, 
and in turn distorting trade flows." Additionally, in the first 
half of the 1980's, "these policies also relied on exports for 
the lion's share of domestic economic growth."
Microeconomic policies and practices are also singled out, 
because they "reduce the role of imports substantially below what 
would normally be expected of an industrial economy with Japan's 
economic attributes."
For instance, agricultural prices are found to be "much 
higher than world market prices." From 1980 to 1982, Japan's 
weighted average price at the producer level for seven major 
commodities was 2.44 times higher than the comparable world 
market price, which contrasts with a factor of 1.54 for the 
European Community and 1.16 for the United States.
Japan exhibits the lowest ratio among the industrialized 
countries of imports as a percentage of apparent consumption of 
manufactures. This ratio of 4.4% is contrasted with 13.8% for the 
United States and 37.2% for West Germany.
When compared with other mature industrialized economies, 
Japan exhibits a very low degree of intra-industry 
specialization, that acts against the possibility of importing 
and exporting within the same industry. For 21 industries in 
1980, Japan's index for intra-industry specialization was only 
0.30, compared to 0.67 for the United States, 0.69 for West 
Germany and 0.88 for France. Moreover, the same index for 94 
industries, was only 0.25 for Japan, compared to 0.60 for the 
United States, 0.66 for West Germany and 0.82 for France.
Japan makes extensive use of non-tariff barriers to protect 
its producers of primary products, principally agriculture and 
certain light manufacturing industries, such as textiles, 
apparel, leather, and leather shoes. On agricultural imports, 
Japan maintains 12 quotas, compared to 4 in the United States, 2 
in Belgium, 19 in France, 3 in Germany, 3 in Italy, and 1 in the 
United Kingdom.
Finally, Japan makes intensive use of invisible barriers to 
trade against manufactured imports that are considered "much more 
important and restrictive than formal, visible barriers." Among 
others, the report finds: discriminatory standards and public
procurement; defense of depressed, non-competitive industries; 
promotion of high technology industries; inadequate protection of 
intellectual property; and a complex, inefficient distribution 
system.
43
To confront the situation thus depicted, the following 
macroeconomic recommendations are offered: 1) the gradual
reduction of the U.S. budget deficit; 2) the stimulus of domestic 
demand by means of structural reforms in Japan; and 3) bilateral 
consultations on the adoption of these measures.
At the microeconomic level, the adoption of a 
results-oriented strategy is recommended for the United States, 
to promote Japan's imports of value-added manufactured and 
agricultural goods.
Other options were also examined and rejected. First, the 
negotiation of a U.S.-Japan free trade area (FTA), because "it 
simply does not get at Japan's invisible trade barriers." Second, 
a so-called "do-nothing" option, because "Japan does not react 
like other nations to macroeconomic conditions that normally 
correct external imbalances." Third, the negotiation of a managed 
reduction of the imbalance, because "it would deal with the 
symptoms of the problem and not the fundamental causes." Fourth, 
the negotiation of "market-based rules," as well as the 
establishment of an independent dispute settlement panel to 
enforce the rules, because invisible barriers to trade "do not 
lend themselves to discipline through a rules-based system." 
Fifth, filing a complaint based on article XXIII of the GATT, 
because it is not possible to file a case against an entire 
country. Finally, free trade zones in Japan to promote imports, 
because of their ineffectiveness to overcome Japan's invisible 
barriers.
The two labor representatives of the task force dissented 
from the contents of the report. Although they considered the 
analysis useful, the recommendations "fell far short oi what is 
needed." Because, in their own terms, the issue is "not simply 
growth rates, but the propensity of the two countries to import."
To conclude, the task force derived a list of lessons from 
the experience of negotiating with Japan. These lessons 
illustrate the negotiating posture recommended by the task force. 
Lesson 1: be very tough and willing to use all your leverage; 
lesson 2: giving the Japanese the initiative is dangerous; lesson 
3: protectionism in Japan is still a problem; lesson 4:
protectionism in Japan is multidimensional; lesson 5: temporary 
U.S. import restrictions are justified; lesson 6: trade issues 
have a rationale that extends beyond improving the trade 
imbalance.
If adopted, this negotiating stance will certainly transform 
the trade imbalance between Japan and the United States into the 
relationship of major tension of the present international 
trading system.
44
III. 2. SUPER 301 UNLEASHED (WDW/16/89 - 31 MAY 1989)
Amidst a soaring dollar and news that Japan's trade surplus 
is growing, last Friday, President Bush issued a statement 
indicating that, as mandated by the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) would present to the Congress a list of priority 
practices and countries to be submitted to investigation, 
according to the so-called Super 301 provisions.
The practices and the countries that will be subject to 
investigation are:
- Quantitative restrictions and import licensing in Brazil;
- Exclusionary government procurement of satellites and 
supercomputers in Japan;
- Trade-restrictive technical standards of forestry products 
in Japan;
- Barriers to trade in services, such as the closure of 
India's market to foreign insurance companies; and
- Trade-related investment measures, such as export 
requirements or the use of locally-produced inputs as 
practiced by India.
The identification of these countries triggers 
investigations and negotiations, during the following 12 to 18 
months, that will seek to eliminate the identified barriers.
Additionally, a sixth category of barriers was addressed 
separately, through the so-called "Special 301" procedure of the 
1988 Omnibus Trade Bill, designed to deal with the inadequate 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). The procedure 
in this case is somewhat different, because it has led to the 
identification of 25 countries whose practices are said to 
"deserve special attention." Seventeen of these countries have 
been placed on a Watch List while the remaining 8 countries were 
placed on a Priority Watch List.
The countries that appear in the Watch List are: Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Within the next year, the USTR will 
step up efforts with these countries to resolve problems derived 
from the existence of barriers to market access or with the 
inadequate protection of IPRs.
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The countries that appear in the Priority Watch List are: 
Brazil, India, Mexico, People's Republic of China, Republic of 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Thailand. Because of recent 
progress with each of these countries in bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations, only accelerated action plans for 
resolving outstanding issues will be agreed within the next 150 
days. Consequently, their status will be reviewed again no later 
than November 1, 1989.
The statement by President Bush mentioned that the decision 
had been discussed extensively with the members of the Economic 
Policy Council — the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, State 
and Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the 
National Security Adviser and the USTR. Consensus finally emerged 
that these Super 301 measures were used: nl) as a tool to open 
foreign markets, and 2) in support of the objectives of the 
United States in the on-going Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations."
Nonetheless, as reported, the Economic Policy Council split 
in two clearly distinct factions. On one side, Commerce Secretary 
Mossbacher, Agriculture Secretary Yeutter and USTR Hills were in 
favor of mentioning specific countries, to avoid a Congressional 
backlash. On the other side, Secretary Baker, Budget Director 
Darman, Economic Adviser Boskin and Security Adviser Scowcroft 
were opposed to the specific mention of Japan, mainly because of 
overall foreign policy considerations, such as the risk of a
trade war and even of a financial crisis. They also wanted to 
avoid embarrassing a government already paralyzed by political 
scandals. In the end, President Bush and Secretary Brady sided 
with the first group, or with "the pragmatists," as they prefer 
to be called.
Several other trading partners were able to escape mention 
for several reasons. One of the most notable was the Republic of 
Korea, barely escaping its inclusion in the Super 301 list 
because just a few days before it had "agreed to liberalize
conditions for foreign investment and to eliminate import bans 
and other measures to protect local production.”
Almost the same happened with Taiwan, because reportedly it 
was in the process of agreeing "to develop an action plan that 
liberalizes trade and promotes" opening its market "to all 
exporters."
The absence of these trading partners from the Super 301 
"hit list" was offered as a demonstration of "the value of
bilateral negotiations on particular practices to complement 
multilateral negotiations on generic rules to discipline such 
practices."
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Nonetheless, probably the most conspicuous absentee from 
the list is the European Community (EC). The explanation given in 
this case was that "important U.S. negotiating priorities, will 
be better pursued at this time outside of section 301, especially 
through multilateral negotiations in the Uruguay Round." 
Specifically mentioned are certain "agricultural practices," such 
as the EC variable import levies on grains, sugar, dairy 
products, beef, poultry, eggs, pork and processed products made 
of these commodities." These practices are said to "afford 
protection to European producers of these products, adversely 
affecting U.S. exports to the EC." Also mentioned are European 
Community export subsidies, as well as Japanese import barriers 
on rice.
Finally, another issue that was seen as "better addressed 
outside of section 301 at the present time is the substantial 
financial support European Airbus partner governments have 
provided to their AIRBUS CONSORTIUM member companies."
Obviously, reactions to these decisions did not make 
themselves wait. For instance, Japan's Minister of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, declared that "the 
Government of Japan has no intention of entering into 
negotiations with the United States under the conditions imposed" 
by the new trade bill.
A Brazilian official who works on debt negotiations said, if 
the U.S. restricts the entry of Brazilian goods, it would 
"condemn us to having problems in paying the debt." Also, the 
Director of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry's economy department, 
Samuel Guimaraes, said that the licensing requirements ciced by 
the U.S. "are not discriminatory, are temporary and are necessary 
to the debt situation."
Finally, India's Commerce Minister, Dinesh Singh, said "we 
regard this law and action as totally unjustified, irrational and 
unfair."
To conclude, beyond this opening Super 301 salvo and its 
aftershocks, it remains to be seen if the "hit list" has not 
opened the gates to unprecedented levels of turbulence in 
international trade relations.
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III. 3. IMPLEMENTING THE U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA 
(WDW/19/89 - 21 JUNE 1989)
On March 1, according to the Trade Act of 1974 as amended, 
the President of the United States submitted to the Congress a 
national trade policy agenda for the current calendar year. This 
year's agenda contains the following seven objectives:
1) Seek substantial progress in the GATT's Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations is the "higher trade 
priority in 1989."
2) Broaden access to foreign markets by eliminating or 
offsetting foreign unfair trade practices.
3) Implement the free trade agreements with Canada and 
Israel.
4) Promote exports of goods and services.
5) Use temporary relief for U.S. producers injured by 
fairly traded imports.
6) Eliminate trade-restrictive barriers practices of 
developing countries, while helping their economies to 
develop further.
7) Ensure appropriate consideration of trade objectives in 
any conflicts between trade and national security 
interests.
While all these objectives are pursued simultaneously, in 
two of them concrete results were recently registered. For 
instance, within the Uruguay Round, in Geneva on 5-8 April 1989, 
the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) successfully completed the 
Mid-Term Review, initiated in Montreal in December 1988. It 
should be recalled that in Montreal the participants were unable 
to attain consensus on four of the fifteen negotiating items 
contained in the agenda of GATT's Ministerial meeting. On these 
four outstanding issues, agreement was finalized at the senior 
official level only until the Geneva April meeting.
The differences were more profound on agricultural reform, 
particularly about the negotiations' long term objective, finally 
defined as "to obtain substantial progressive reductions of 
agricultural protection and support, resulting in correcting and 
preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural 
markets."
The text approved specifies that all direct or indirect 
measures affecting agricultural import access, be it tariffs, 
non-tariff barriers, subsidies, as well as export competition, 
will be subject to negotiation. Moreover, the approved work 
program has been considered ambitious, because it should lead to 
the presentation, by December 1989, of detailed proposals for the 
attainment of the long-term objective of converting non-tariff
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measures into tariffs, as well as to the more controversial 
decoupling of trade from income support. Finally, the agreement 
reached also endorses the harmonization of health and sanitary 
regulations. No wonder, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
considered the results in agriculture "an outstanding success."
Although in December agriculture appeared as the main 
hurdle, as time went by, it became evident that intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) were more loaded with controversy. The 
text approved specifies that negotiations should lead to the 
approval of a comprehensive agreement on IPRs containing the 
following: 1) adequate substantive intellectual property
standards; 2) effective means for enforcement of such standards, 
and 3) effective and expeditious dispute settlement procedures.
The U.S. Department of Commerce considers that "all of the 
key U.S. objectives for the IPR framework text were met," and 
that "all areas of major concern" will be covered by such an 
agreement. Among these areas, the following appear prominently: 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and chemical products, 
copyright protection for sound recordings and computer software, 
trade secret protection for proprietary manufacturing processes 
and data, and effective enforcement to stop the counterfeiting of 
trade marks and copyrighted materials, such as books, motion 
pictures and recordings. To illustrate the importance attached to 
IPR protection, a study by the International Trade Commission, of 
February 1988, "estimates worldwide annual losses to U.S. 
industry from inadequate foreign protection of IPR to be between 
$43 and $61 billion," which represents two-to three times as much 
as estimated in 1983.
The third issue left outstanding in Montreal was textiles. 
The agreement reached aims at undertaking "substantive 
negotiations on negotiating approaches that could permit the 
eventual integration of this sector into the GATT."
Finally, contrary to expectations, the issue of safeguards 
was the least controversial of the four left unresolved in 
Montreal. A framework was agreed for the establishment of 
multilateral control over safeguard measures.
These four agreements, added to the previous eleven reached 
in Montreal — on services, functioning of the GATT system, 
dispute settlement, tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical 
products, trade-related investment measures, MTN agreements and 
arrangements, subsidies and countervailing measures, GATT 
articles, and natural resource-based products—  provide the 
guidelines for the remainder of the Uruguay Round, scheduled for 
conclusion on December 1990. It remains to be seen if this final 
phase of the negotiations will yield the same positive results.
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The other objective of the U.S. trade policy agenda, about 
which more controverted steps have been adopted, is the 
expansion of access to foreign markets by seeking the dismantling 
of what are judged as "unfair trade practices."
These steps took the form of the initiation by the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) of investigations of practices 
judged unfair in three trading partners: Brazil, India and Japan, 
in what has been termed "the unleash of SUPER 301" (WDW/16/89).
The case of Brazil has to do with "certain quantitative 
import restrictions," contained in "an import prohibition list 
that covers approximately 1,000 items, barring U.S. exports." 
Also, Brazil is accused of "using its licensing regime to 
implement company-specific and sectoral import quotas, which 
impede many important U.S. export items." Thus, the conclusion is 
derived that "the lack of transparency of Brazil's licensing 
system creates uncertainty for U.S. exporters to Brazil and 
inhibits market access."
The government of India is cited twice, for the imposition 
of trade-related investment measures and for the existence of 
barriers to sales of insurance in India by foreign insurance 
companies.
Finally, the government of Japan is under investigation for 
the following practices: prohibiting the procurement of foreign 
satellites by government entities; the denial of access to U.S. 
super-computer suppliers to the Japanese public sector market; 
and the imposition of import restrictions of forest products.
From this very brief description, it can be said that the 
activism of the new Administration in pursuing the objectives of 
its trade policy agenda has generated some immediate pay-offs. 
Hopefully, these intermediate results will sustain the 
accomplishment of outlasting and positive consequences for the 
international trading system as a whole.
III. 4. U.S. EXTERNAL IMBALANCES (WDW/22/89 - 12 JULY 1989)
The seventy-fourth annual report of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (FRBNY) is dedicated to the external imbalances of 
the U.S. economy. In the report's letter of transmission, FRBNY 
President, Gerald Corrigan, states that he regards these "massive 
and unsustainable imbalances" as "the most formidable problem 
facing the U.S. and the global economy over the next three to 
five years."
50
Within a broad macroeconomic framework, based on the 
national income accounts, the report defines the external 
imbalance "in three technically equivalent ways." First, the 
export-import gap, or the difference between national exports and 
imports of all goods and services; second, the output-spending 
gap, or the difference between national output and spending; and 
third, the saving-investment gap, or the difference between 
national saving and investment.
The current account balance fell into a large deficit in 
1983 and worsened ever since, in sharp contrast with the balanced 
position exhibited during the previous thirty years. In 1987, the 
current account deficit peaked at $154 billion, or 3 1/2 percent 
of GNP, while in 1988 it reached $128 billion, or 2 1/2 percent 
of GNP.
Among the different components of the current account 
balance, the merchandise trade deficit accounts for almost the 
whole, reflecting "both a weakening in export performance and a 
more rapid expansion of imports." By commodity group, since 1982, 
trade in manufactures has accounted for more than four fifths 
— with automobiles representing approximately one third—  of the 
total merchandise trade deficit. By regions, the deficit has been 
widespread throughout all of them, with Japan and the Asian Newly 
Industrialized Economies (NIEs) accounting for more than two 
thirds of the overall trade deficit. In Latin America the U.S. 
remains the major trading partner, but U.S. exports have been 
considerably affected by the severe constraints on the capacity 
to import imposed by the adjustment process undertaken 
throughout the region, wiping out the small U.S. surpluses that 
previously prevailed.
Since 1982, the output-spending gap "reflects a major break 
from the past on the spending side, but not on the output side." 
As shares of GNP, of the three main aggregate components of 
domestic spending on goods and services, only private consumption 
has grown faster than in previous years. Meanwhile, the other two 
— government purchases and investment—  have not experienced 
significant changes. Even so, it is "quite misleading" to 
conclude that "the external imbalance problem is limited to 
consumer spending alone."
Relative to GNP, since 1982, private consumption 
expenditures, on average, have remained "unusually high," at more 
than two and a half percent over the total average output of 
1948-82, and over 3 to 3 1/2 percent in the late 1970s.
Presently, total government purchases of goods and services 
are lower than the average for 1948-82. Nonetheless, transfer 
payments from the federal government have been "substantially
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greater since the early 1980s." Since these are almost fully 
converted into consumption spending, in recent years, "close to 
15 percent of private consumption spending" is generated by 
transfer payments.
The level of net investment as a ratio of GNP has averaged 
about 5 percent, two percent below the postwar average. This 
reduced share of net investment over GNP has led to increased 
borrowing from abroad. Since 1982, more than half of U.S. net 
private investment has been financed by net inflows of foreign 
savings, destined to the purchase of financial and nonfinancial 
assets. In these terms, "the total amount of such holdings is now 
equivalent to almost 13 percent of the U.S. capital stock, 
compared with only 6 percent in 1982."
The saving-investment gap resulted from a drop in the 
national saving rate, "from an average of about 6 1/2 percent of 
GNP in the 1968-82 period. . . to an average of about 2 1/2
percent of GNP in the 1983-88 period."
In the private sector, on average, no significant change is 
found in the rate of corporate saving during the preceding 15 
years. By contrast, "household saving as a ratio to GNP fell to 
the lowest levels in the postwar period during 1986 and 1987, and 
averaged only about 3 1/4 percent over 1983-87, compared with 5 
1/4 percent over 1968-82." As a consequence, "total net private 
saving as a ratio to GNP averaged about two percentage points 
below the level" of the 1968-82 period.
In the public sector, "the largest contribution to the 
decline in national saving as a ratio to GNP has come from the 
unprecedented increase in dissaving generated by the federal 
budget deficits since the early 1980s." This is illustrated by 
the fact that "nearly 70 percent of the decline in net national 
saving from the 1968-82 period to the 1983-87 period is 
attributable to the rise in federal budget deficits."
The international dimension of the problem shows that two 
other factors are decisive to arrive at a complete overview of 
the U.S. external deficit. First, the pace of overall demand and 
economic growth among the major U.S. trading partners and second, 
the dollar exchange rate.
The major industrial countries exported "a larger share of 
their output to the United States over the period 1982-86 than in 
the preceding 15 years." Furthermore, "a disproportionate share 
of domestic and foreign spending was shifted from U.S. goods to 
foreign goods because of the dramatic rise in the exchange value 
of the dollar over the first half of the 1980s".
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Some of the financial consequences of external deficits are 
also mentioned. For instance, "U.S. borrowings abroad have 
averaged about $100 billion on an annual basis over the last six 
years." During the same period, U.S. "borrowings used up about 14 
percent of total net savings of all other industrial countries, 
with the ratio peaking at about 18 percent in 1985."
From 1983 to 1985, private capital inflows provided all of 
this external financing, "more than four-fifths of those inflows 
consisted of bank financing and securities acquisitions by 
foreigners, while direct investment flows accounted for only 
about 15 percent of the overall financing requirement." This has 
been reversed since 1986, because "increases in net official 
holdings of dollar assets," have compensated for a shortfall in 
private flows from private sources. In 1987, "central bank 
purchases of U.S. dollar assets were almost equal” to the total 
U.S. external deficit.
Foreign borrowing, measured by the holdings of financial and 
nonfinancial assets, has transformed the United States "from a 
net creditor status of $140 billion in 1981-82 to a position as 
the world's largest debtor by far, with an outstanding net 
external debt of nearly $500 billion at end 1988."
Also, "in absolute dollar terms, the U.S. external debt is 
the largest in the world," amounting at the end of 1988 to 10 
percent of GNP. This is judged as "neither particularly large nor 
historically unprecedented.” After all, the United States is 
"not just a large industrial country but the largest economy in 
the world by far." It represents "one-fourth of the world's GNP," 
and it is "roughly equal to the combined GNP of Japan, Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom."
The main question raised by this overview is how can the 
U.S. economy be adjusted "in an environment of continuing 
economic growth abroad and financial stability in the world 
economy." By themselves, trade and monetary policy cannot do the 
job, unless they are accompanied by direct measures to deal with 
domestic macroeconomic imbalances, particularly in the form of a 
reduction of the federal budget deficit "aimed at shifting 
resources to investment spending by lowering public and private 
expenditures on other activities."
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III. 5. FREER TRADE BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 
(WDW/31/89 - 18 OCTOBER 1989)
Preceded by ample press coverage about the successful 
application of economic reforms, such as the privatization of 
state enterprises and the control of inflation by means of an 
agreement between business and labor, President Carlos Salinas 
initiated his first state visit to the United States, from Sunday 
October 1 until Friday October 6.
The program of the visit was impressive. It began with an 
informal dinner offered by President Bush at Camp David and 
included a working lunch at the White House, as well as a speech 
by President Salinas to a joint session of Congress.
The main highlight of the meeting took the form of an 
"understanding," signed by Secretaries Baker and Solana, 
"regarding trade and investment facilitation talks." Also, an 
"action plan” was signed by the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
Mexican Secretary of Commerce to initiate such talks.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Carla 
Hills, this new "understanding" builds on the continuing work of 
the 1987 "framework of principles and procedures for 
consultations regarding trade and investment relations." 
Additionally, Ambassador Hills explained that "unlike the 1987 
Framework, which simply provides a consultative forum for 
resolving problems, the new Understanding establishes a 
negotiating process for seizing and expanding trade and 
investment opportunities."
The preamble of the understanding recognizes "the importance 
of the bilateral trade and investment relations to the well being 
and prosperity of their peoples" and takes into account "the
economic interdependence between Mexico and the United States."
The agreement thus recognizes Mexico's position as the 
third-largest market for U.S. exports, only preceded by Canada 
and Japan, as well as that almost three quarters of Mexican 
exports go to the United States. In all, trade in both ways
amounted in 1988 to $44 billion, with Mexico enjoying a surplus 
of $3 billion. Furthermore, the relationship has intensified, 
because in 1987 trade in both ways amounted to $35 billion.
Secretaries Baker and Solana also recognized the progress
made under the 1987 Framework, "in further improving the
bilateral process of consultations," pointing to the role of the 
work groups established in the areas of agriculture, industry, 
investment and intellectual property rights, services, tariffs 
and coordination.
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The "mandate for trade and investment facilitation talks" 
contains the following decisions:
1) "To move beyond the consultative and dispute settlement 
functions of the Framework Understanding to negotiate in product 
areas and interrelated issues in order to facilitate trade and 
investment and to promote predictability and certainty in both 
countries."
2) "To conduct these negotiations in a manner consistent 
with the principles set forth in the Framework Understanding, and 
with the rights and obligations of each country under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations."
3) "To ensure the continuation of consultations initiated 
under the Framework Understanding, in particular the ongoing 
activities under the above cited Work Groups."
4) "To expand, where appropriate, the scope of these Work 
Groups to provide for a comprehensive evaluation of trade and 
investment issues that is conducted through analyses of product 
areas and interrelated issues, including (but not limited to) 
tariffs, non tariff barriers to trade, investment, intellectual 
property rights, technology, services, marketing restraints, 
distribution problems and trade remedy actions."
5) "To initiate 'trade and investment facilitation talks,' 
which are to be comprehensive negotiations on market access and 
trade and investment facilitation in product areas and 
interrelated issues."
The "action plan" for the implementation of this mandate 
contains a very detailed schedule for negotiations, beginning in 
November with joint decisions adopted in binational teams of 
experts, on the specific topics that will be initially covered. 
These binational teams will then proceed to gather information 
and to analyze current trade and investment difficulties. The 
results of these analyses will be contained in reports that will 
serve as the basis for the negotiations that will start in March 
1990. The results attained during the first phase of these 
negotiations will be announced in July 1990. The same system will 
be followed for the second phase with the hope that the results 
of this phase will be announced by October 1991, when new 
binational teams will be created.
The comments made by the Presidents during the signing 
ceremony reveal the importance attached to the new understanding. 
President Bush said that it "moves beyond the consultation ... to 
create a mandate for negotiation." For President Salinas it 
"opens up additional sources of employment in Mexico for 
Mexicans. It is also encouraging the export of products to
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generate the well-being amongst all our citizens. It will further 
the investment processes so that Mexicans can find a job in 
Mexico. That is the central purpose of my visit to this country."
To dispel any doubts, Ambassador Hills made it quite clear 
that these agreements "are not aimed at reaching a 'free trade 
agreement' with Mexico, nor are they intended to provide Mexico 
with preferential treatment." Nonetheless, in Ambassador Hills' 
terms, they constitute "another important step in the 
liberalization of trade between the United States and its third 
largest trading partner."
Trade was not the only subject in the agenda. Another 
agreement was signed on the environmental protection of Mexico 
City and of border areas. Also, agreements were reached on 
Mexican exports of steel and of textiles and apparel, as well as 
on intellectual property rights. Finally, besides other more 
politically sensitive topics, such as Central America, 
information was exchanged on issues such as agriculture, motor 
vehicles, motor carriers, the Uruguay Round, subsidies and 
countervailing duties, investment and the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP).
In conclusion, as President Bush said during the signing 
ceremony, the agreements constitute a recognition of the "special 
relationship" that exists between the two countries.
III. 6. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL ON SERVICES 
(WDW/34/89 - 8 NOVEMBER 1989)
With the presentation, on October 23, of a comprehensive 
negotiating proposal on services, according to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Ms. Carla Hills, the Uruguay Round of 
international trade talks is "entering the most creative phase.”
As described by the office of the U.S.T.R., this "is the 
first proposal by any country that expresses in legal terms the 
obligations countries would assume under a services agreement." 
Thus, the U.S. delegation continues setting the international 
trade agenda, incorporating novel issues placed beyond the scope 
of existing national and international rules.
The problem, as described by Ms. Hills, "is that trade has 
outgrown the GATT," because there are "areas poorly covered by 
GATT rules, like agriculture, or not covered at all, like 
services, investment and intellectual property," that have 
become "of much greater importance than they once were."
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The relative importance of services in the U.S. economy and 
in international trade is undeniable. Defined broadly as "all 
economic activity other than agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing," services represent about two thirds of U.S. GNP, 
amounting in 1987 to nearly $2.6 trillion (in constant 1982 
dollars) . In August 1989, about three quarters of U.S. 
employment, or 83.2 million jobs, were in service industries. 
Furthermore, in recent years, more than 90 percent of the new 
jobs created in the U.S. have been in services.
Understood as cross-border transactions, as well as sales by 
affiliates located abroad, trade in services has been growing 
steadily. Cross border sales of services amounted to $37 billion 
in 1980 and $92.1 billion in 1988. Additionally, overseas sales 
of services by foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations are 
estimated to have reached $85 billion in 1987. Finally, in the 
second quarter of 1989, of the $31 billion deficit in the U.S. 
current account, $27.7 billion were accounted by merchandise 
trade.
In balance of payments terms, "services" comprise everything 
other than merchandise trade, including receipts and payments of 
investment income. On September 12, 1989, it was learned that the 
U.S. "balance on services" showed a deficit of $176 million in 
the second quarter of 1989, with the same item showing a surplus 
of $1.5 billion in the first quarter.
In these same terms, during the second quarter of 1989, "the 
investment component," that covers slightly more than half of all 
the "services," showed a deficit of about $5 billion, by contrast 
with a surplus of $2.3 billion during all of calendar year 1988. 
However, the other half of the "services," sometimes called "true 
services," exhibited a surplus of $6.8 billion during the second 
quarter of 1989.
In 1988, U.S. exports of services amounted to $92 billion, 
while imports totaled $73 billion. Most of this $19 billion 
surplus was accounted by "other private services," including 
some fastest growers, such as education, financial services, 
insurance, telecommunications, as well as business, professional 
and technical services, including accounting, advertising, 
computer and data processing, data base and information services 
and engineering. The surplus in these "private services" amounted 
to $12.9 billion in 1988. Other services that are growing 
comprise "royalties and fees" for industrial processes, books 
records and tapes, trademarks, broadcasting and recording of live 
events and franchises. This group, in 1988, attained a surplus of 
$8.7 billion.
Finally, recent revisions have been made in U.S. figures for 
three major areas of the service sector — expenditures by foreign 
students in the U.S., net after expenditures by Americans
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studying abroad; some exports by professional firms, such as law 
firms; and improved data from travel and tourism. As a result, 
the Commerce Department found $23 billion more exports than 
previously reported, as well as $11.6 more imports. Added to 
revisions in other trade areas, the unrecorded value of U.S. net 
exports amounted to about $20 billion a year. Thus, as reported 
in The Wall Street Journal "the U.S. trade deficit was running 
closer to $75 billion than to the $95 billion in 1988, and $55 
billion (annualized) rather than the $80 billion in the first 
quarter of 1989."
The stated goal of the proposed agreement is "to establish a 
multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in 
services, including elaboration of possible disciplines for 
individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade under 
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as 
a means of promoting economic growth of all trading partners and 
the development of developing countries."
The principal obligations that would be assumed by the 
subscribers to the proposed agreement include: l) national
treatment: foreign services would receive treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to domestic services; 2) 
establishment: foreign service operators have the right to
establish or expand a commercial presence for the provision of a 
service in the host country; 3) cross-border services: no
restriction can be imposed on the provision of services on the 
basis that the provider is located partially or wholly outside 
the territory of the host country; 4) temporary entry of service 
providers should be unrestricted; 5) transparency: to publish
laws and regulations affecting services and to allow interested 
parties to comment on proposed regulations; 6)non-discrimination: 
no less favorable treatment can be granted to other signatories;
7) domestic regulation is allowed when it does not nullify or 
impair the obligations of the agreement; 8) government monopolies 
and exclusive service providers should provide services on a 
non-discriminatory basis; 9) subsidies are prohibited, if they 
cause injury to foreign services providers; and 10) restrictions 
to payments and transfers across borders derived from services 
transactions are limited.
The agreement would be applied to "a universe of service 
activities" listed as Annex I, containing in the first column a 
schedule" of those service activities excluded by the signatory. 
This list of service activities will be identified by the GATT 
Secretariat and it should be approved by the signatories. 
Additionally, special provisions for individual sectors can be 
developed in "annexes" to the basic agreement and "protocols" 
can be added, if interested signatories decide to increase 
degrees of liberalization for a sector already covered by the 
agreement. Also, reservations with respect to specific services 
made by any signatory, on the condition that they should be
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withdrawn as soon as circumstances permit. The removal of these 
reservations becomes the primary purpose of subsequent
negotiations that will be held after the agreement enters into
force.
Finally, an intergovernmental Committee on Trade in 
Services is proposed to oversee the agreement's functioning with
the support of the GATT Secretariat.
III. 7. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL ON AGRICULTURE 
(WDW/35/89 - 29 NOVEMBER 1989)
Two days after presenting a proposal on services 
(WDW/34/89) , on October 25, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) submitted to the Uruguay Round "a 
comprehensive proposal for agricultural reform." In the words of 
Ambassador Julius Katz, Deputy USTR, the presentation of this 
proposal to the Agricultural Negotiating Group "at this time has 
provided a spark to these critically important negotiations, 
which will intensify in the weeks ahead."
As agreed during the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round, 
December 1989 is the deadline for the presentation of proposals 
and this is the first comprehensive proposal submitted thus far. 
Others presented by the European Community, Japan and the Cairns 
Group, address some, not all, the aspects of the negotiations.
Since it appears likely that no other comprehensive proposals 
will be submitted, as with services, the United States has also 
set the agenda for the negotiations about the far more 
controverted and crucial issue of the reform of world 
agriculture.
As emphasized by Ambassador Katz, "although agriculture is 
one of the 15 issues being negotiated in the Uruguay Round, most 
participants agree that the success of the entire negotiations 
will depend on the ability of the Contracting Parties to agree 
upon an acceptable agricultural package."
There seems to be consensus that this is one of the sectors 
of the international economy that badly needs reform, because of 
the impressive list of aberrations caused by blatant 
protectionist practices that world agriculture exhibits.
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In the industrialized countries, for instance, current 
agricultural policies generate enormous burdens for taxpayers and 
consumers, estimated by the OECD to cost $275 billion annually. 
Also, present policies encourage levels of overproduction that 
generate well publicized "butter mountains." Such policies have 
made of the European Community the world's largest exporter of 
sugar and have resulted in Japanese self-sufficiency in rice, 
based on the subsidized operation of what are known as "the 
industrialized world's least efficient, part-time farmers." 
Meanwhile, Japanese consumers dedicate a record 20% of their 
personal consumption expenditures to the purchase of food, 
compared to 18% in France and Germany, 15% in the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom, 13% in Canada and 11% in the United States. 
Finally, the U.S. federal government spends a yearly average of 
$60,000 in every full-time subsidized farmer, whose net worth is 
ten times greater than the average family. Moreover, these 
subsidies amount every year to an equivalent of almost one week 
of work of the average non-farm head of household.
The costs for developing countries are also staggering. It 
is estimated that a 50% reduction in the trade restraints applied 
against coffee and cocoa, in 1975-77, would raise the export 
earnings of developing countries, in 1985 dollars, by at least 
$600 million. Also, in 1975-77, a 50% reduction in the OECD 
tariff on sugar, as well as the equivalent relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions, would yield an annual increase of $1.5 
billion in the export earnings of developing countries. Finally, 
the overall benefit of a 50% reduction in OECD tariffs on 
agricultural imports and the equivalent relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions, in 1985 dollars, would generate $3.5 
billion a year of increased export earnings for developing 
countries.
Given these impressive aberrations exhibited by world 
agriculture, the negotiating proposal tabled by the USTR in the 
Uruguay Round is bound to generate friction and controversy among 
different negotiating groups.
The basic objective of the proposal is described as the 
achievement of "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading 
system," by means of transforming "many existing internal support 
measure to policies that will be less trade distorting." In 
other words, the basic issue underlying the negotiations is the 
"decoupling" of assistance to farmers from prices and production 
levels, to grant such assistance in trade-neutral, welfare 
measures, instead of policies that encourage overproduction.
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The United States negotiating proposal seeks to reform trade 
in agriculture in four key areas:
A) to improve market access by means of:
1) the conversion of all non-tariff barriers into bound 
tariffs;
2) substantial reductions in existing tariffs over ten 
years ;
3) the adoption of tariff rate quotas and safeguard 
measures to facilitate the transition process.
B) to enhance export competition by:
1) phasing out export subsidies, including tax 
differentials, over five years;
2) prohibiting export restrictions for foodstuffs 
imposed because of short domestic supplies.
C) to avoid the trade distorting effects of internal support
measures by:
1) phasing out those policies that are most trade 
distorting;
2) imposing discipline on policies that interfere less;
3) making policies that have relatively minor trade 
impact meet specific criteria.
D) to coordinate within GATT sanitary and phitosanitary
standards by means of:
1) compulsory notification of national adoption of 
measures;
2) obligation to respond to requests for informal 
consultations ;
3) procedures for the settlement of disputes.
Finally, as an indication of sources of resistance, an 
econometric study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
has identified potential winners and losers if the proposal is 
adopted as presented by the USTR.
The study estimates the net welfare gain resulting from the 
abolition by the industrialized countries of subsidies and other 
trade distorting measures in almost $30 billion. Also the 
analysis of the distribution of these benefits by groups of 
countries reveals the following conclusions.
Contrary to common wisdom, the European Community appears as 
the main beneficiary, with net welfare gains of $14 billion. The 
EC agricultural balance would decline, while European producer
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welfare would drop sharply. Nonetheless, these losses would be 
more than compensated by the benefits to consumers and taxpayers.
By contrast, the gains for the United States would amount to 
$8.6 billion and for Japan to $6.3 billion. Additionally, for a 
group of developing countries classified as agricultural 
exporters, including Brazil and Argentina, the gains are modest, 
amounting to $700 million.
Among the losers the study identifies the centrally planned 
economies, incurring losses of $800 million; as well as the Asian 
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), with losses of $900 
million. Finally, a group of developing countries that are net 
importers of agricultural products, among which appear all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries other than Argentina and Brazil, 
as well as numerous African and Asian countries, incur losses 
estimated in $4.4 billion.
These estimates only indicate the degree of controversy that 
will surround the coming negotiations.
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IV. INDEBTEDNESS
IV. 1. MOVEMENT ON THE DEBT FRONT (WDW/2/89 - 25 JANUARY 1989)
As soon as Secretary Baker left the Treasury Department, to 
coordinate the campaign of then Vice-President Bush, rumblings 
began to be heard indicating that there was movement on the debt 
front.
These events took the form of significant departures from 
standard operating procedures in the management of debtors 
difficulties. For instance, a split appeared between the 
multilateral financial institutions active on the debt issue. 
First, there was the approval by the World Bank of a $50 million 
structural adjustment loan (SAL) to Honduras, without requiring 
previous payment of the recipients' outstanding arrears with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Second, during the IMF-World 
Bank September meetings, in Berlin, the World Bank granted a 
$1.25 billion loan to Argentina, without previously requiring the 
signature of an agreement with the IMF. Finally, the U.S. 
Treasury granted a bridge loan of $3.5 billion to Mexico, without 
clarifying the terms upon which the recipient had to come to an 
agreement with either the Fund or the World Bank.
On top of these events, came the appointment — the morning 
after the election—  of Mr. James Baker III, as Secretary of 
State, which immediately led to several conclusions. Given the 
experience he gained as Secretary of the Treasury, it was 
asserted that from the vantage point of the State Department 
Secretary Baker would address debt related issues from a more 
political perspective. Furthermore, Secretary Baker is said to be 
part of a triangle in a network of decision-makers who define 
themselves as "results oriented," or more pragmatic than 
ideological. (WDW/1/89).
Finally, the signals emanating from the biggest debtors 
indicate that they are reaching the most critical point in their 
fatigue with debt-servicing, foreboding that the time may have 
come for new departures on the debt front.
Three recent statements made by the heads of the most 
crucial banking regulatory agencies of the United States not only 
indicated that there was movement, but also pointed to the 
direction that this movement will take. These statements were 
made by three top banking regulators at the hearings on the 
prospects for the international economy and its effect on the 
LDC debt crisis, held by the Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, of the U.S. House of Representatives, on 4-5
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January 1989, less than 24 hours after the convening of the 
101st. Congress.
Chaired by Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Texas), during 
these hearings statements were heard about the social progress of 
less developed countries; about the problems and prospects in the 
world economy; and about the prospects for the LDC debt crisis.
Nonetheless, as mentioned, the most relevant statements were 
those made about the U.S. financial system exposure to the LDC 
debt crisis, by the following officials from the most important 
U.S. banking regulatory agencies: the Chairman of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Mr. W. Seidman; the 
Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve System (FED), Mr. Manuel 
Johnson; and the Comptroller of the Currency (COC), Mr. Robert 
Clarke.
Briefly, these statements basically coincide in concluding 
that the indebtedness of developing countries no longer 
threatens the banking system of the United States.
For instance, Mr. Seidman, from FDIC, concluded that "the 
LDC debt situation, in and of itself, poses no immediate 
discernible threat to the financial condition of the FDIC." Mr. 
Johnson, from the FED, said that Mthe potential effect on the 
U.S. banking system of the debt problems of the developing 
countries has been managed with some degree of success." He 
concluded that "U.S. banks today are in a better position to 
absorb the impact of any suspension of debt servicing by 
borrowers, domestic or foreign." Finally, Mr. Clarke, from the 
COC, said that "the vulnerability of the U.S. banking system has 
lessened significantly."
The responses to these statements did not make themselves 
wait. They came first and foremost from Mr. Henry Kissinger, who 
no longer speaks only as former Secretary of State, or as private 
consultant to some of the bigger banks, because of the recent 
appointment of two of his closest collaborators, Mr. L. 
Eagleburger and Mr. B. Scowcroft, as Deputy Secretary of State 
and National Security Adviser, respectively. The other response 
came from none other than the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), the powerful Washington-based, umbrella organization that 
represents 146 commercial banks from 40 countries.
Mr. Kissinger supports the statement made by President Bush 
that the debt crisis is not only economic but also political and 
that it must therefore be solved in a political framework. He 
recognizes that the Baker Plan's reliance on growth remains 
central to any solution and considers that "to define the 
conditions of growth involves a highly political act for all of 
the countries concerned." He proposes that the "key element of 
such a solution will be a reallocation of the burden of debt
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— both principal and interest—  between debtors, banks and 
governments." And concludes asserting that "the banks cannot 
carry the burden alone."
For its part, the IIF issued a document entitled The Way 
Forward For Middle-Income Countries. which basically asserts 
that the solution is to restore market access for these 
countries and that the responsibility "rests first and foremost 
with the debtor countries and depends on their economic
policies." Second, in order to undertake new lending to middle
income debtors, the banks demand from creditor governments and 
international financial institutions what they call "credit 
enhancement," or guarantees of repayment, both for new loans and
debt conversions. Finally, the Institute warns that "outright
mandatory debt cancellation would be an unconstitutional taking 
of property," which "would be contested in the courts."
These reactions were explained by "a Treasury official" 
quoted in The New York Times. He said that "the weight of the 
debt burden has now shifted in a large way to the borrowers." 
Furthermore, "the Governments have determined that the banks are 
out of the woods on loans to nations like Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina and that they are healthy enough now to resume the 
lending that they largely abandoned after the outbreak of the 
debt problem in 1982."
In other terms, the much-awaited third stage of the debt 
crisis apparently has finally arrived, in the form of a 
modification of the Baker Plan, where "changes in policy with 
respect to banks emerge as an important revision," shifting the 
burden away from the wearied debtors and without a transfer of 
the risk to the creditor governments.
The specific ingredients of what President Bush called this 
"whole new look” to the debt issue remain unknown, but it cannot 
be denied that there is movement and that this time apparently it 
is in the right direction.
IV. 2. THE EXTERNAL DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 1988 
(WDW/4/89 - 9 FEBRUARY 1989)
Perhaps because of the réanimation of the debate about the 
external indebtedness of developing countries, the World Bank did 
not wait until the end of the year to release the 1988-89 edition 
of the World Debt Tables. Just this past week, LDC debt returned 
to the forefront with a vengeance by way of its global treatment 
in the last meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7), held in 
Washington on February 3-4.
65
Based on the Debtor Reporting System (DRS), the Tables 
compile data for 111 developing countries and constitute one of 
the most authoritative sources for the quantification and 
analysis of this resilient issue.
This year, for the first time, the tables are issued in 
three volumes. The first volume contains an analysis of recent 
developments in international lending in reporting countries, 
selected regions and other groupings. The geographic regions are: 
Africa, south of the Sahara; East Asia and Pacific; Europe and 
the Mediterranean; Latin America and the Caribbean; North Africa 
and the Middle East; and South Asia. Other groupings are: the 
highly indebted countries (HICs), a group of 17 countries 
accounting for nearly half of all developing-country debt—  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, 
Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia; as well as 
low-income Africa; low-income Asia; middle-income oil importers; 
and oil exporters. Additionally, the first volume contains the 
following four appendixes: I) the emerging consensus on
low-income Africa's debt; II) debt trends in 1988; III) debt 
rescheduling negotiations in 1988; and IV) the World Bank 
currency pooling and repayment system.
The second volume presents the statistical tables by country 
for 1970, 1975 and 1980-1987, while the third volume provides
data for ten years, from 1970 to 1979. These tables contain 
reported or estimated data for public and publicly guaranteed 
long-term debt, short-term debt, as well as about the use of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit.
Also for the first time, the Tables include iniormation 
about the current market value of principal repayments and debt 
outstanding to the World Bank, as well as about the current 
account of each reporting country and workers' remittances.
Here are some of the highlights that appear in the analysis 
and summary tables, under the very suggestive title "the evolving 
debt strategy."
1) At the end of 1988, the external debt of developing 
countries increased by 3 percent, from $1,281 billion in 1987 to 
$1,320 billion, equivalent to almost half of their combined gross 
national product (GNP). This increase was smaller than the 11 
percent registered in 1987.
2) The reasons for this slower growth are found in changes 
in the dollar value of external debt, resulting from exchange 
rate changes, as well as in voluntary debt reductions and in what 
is termed "the continued reluctance of commercial lenders" to 
provide new funds to the HICs, the largest group of debtors.
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3) Two groups of developing countries are considered 
"debt-distressed," those of sub-Saharan Africa and the HICs, 
because in both growth was slower than the average rate for 
developing countries and their investment ratios suffered sharp 
declines.
4) Although in the HICs per capita income and consumption 
have decreased, "the adjustment burden has fallen mainly on 
investment," which has been reduced by roughly equal amounts to 
their net resource transfers.
5) In Latin America, the ratio of investment to GDP declined 
from 21.4 percent in 1980 to 14.9 percent in 1987, lowering 
investment ratios in some cases to levels barely sufficient to 
cover depreciation.
6) Net resource transfers from the HICs to their creditors 
amounted to $74 billion, during 1985-87, or about 3 percent of 
their combined GNP. In 1988, net transfers out of the HICs rose 
to $31 billion, an increase of about 50 percent over the 
preceding year.
7) Despite the Baker Plan's recommendations, net long-term 
lending by private creditors to the HICs declined, from $7.2 
billion in 1984, to $1.3 billion in 1985 and to -$1.9 billion in 
1986.
8) Meanwhile, the commercial banks reduced their exposure to 
HIC risks and strengthened their balance sheets. Between 
September 1985 and September 1987, U.S. banks reduced their 
aggregate exposure to the "Baker 15" countries by 12 percent, 
from $91 billion to $80 billion. Nonetheless, these more 
manageable levels of risk exposure, as well as sizeable loss 
reserves and the consequent enhanced capability to absorb losses 
on discounted loan sales, have not translated themselves into a 
willingness to go beyond limited concerted lending to problem 
debtors.
9) The shift to substantial negative net transfers out of 
the HICs, in the speed and magnitude recorded in recent years, 
represents a new and significant constraint on their expansion, 
at a time when they are attempting to grow out of their debt 
problems.
10) The HICs' debt overhang is considered a burden that 
"reduces incentives to undertake long-term adjustment and holds 
back the growth of these countries." It is also viewed as "a 
continuing threat to the world economy," particularly in a 
situation of rising interest rates and weak commodity prices.
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Beyond the description, the World Bank arrives at some 
relevant conclusions. First of all, the failure of investment to 
recover in the HICs and the declining support from commercial 
creditors are said to be mutually reinforcing. To the point that 
"continued lack of growth and investment in the debtor countries 
are gradually leading to a consensus that new lending must be 
supplemented by voluntary debt reduction."
Second, toward the end of 1987, "it became clear that 
initial expectations about the debt workout strategy that was 
launched in 1985 had not been met." This is considered a result 
of "successive external shocks, failure to spur growth and debt 
fatigue in debtor countries."
Finally, the "strategy for the future" is depicted as 
blending, "into a cooperative framework, voluntary debt 
reduction by commercial banks, serious adjustment efforts by 
debtor countries, the catalytic role of the multilateral 
financial institutions, and changes in the tax and regulatory 
regimes of industrial countries."
To conclude, it is interesting to recall the evolution of 
the World Bank's position on this issue. The 1986-87 Tables saw 
the solution to the indebtedness of developing countries as a 
"common good." Consequently, "the market, left to itself," was 
considered unable to provide "the level of financing needed to 
sustain the debtor countries in their commitment to 
growth-oriented adj ustment."
The 1987-88 Tables moved a step forward, because the issue 
was viewed from a developmental perspective, admitting that "the 
costs of incomplete adjustment and stalled growth have hitherto 
been borne largely by the debtors through foregone income and 
falling living standards."
Finally, in the 1988-89 TABLES the World Bank appears more 
conscious of the political dimension of indebtedness, recognizing 
the need for "a gradual reduction of the HICs' debt overhang." 
Otherwise, the alternative is depicted as "the erosion of 
political support for national governments and prudent economic 
policies and the radicalization of attitudes toward servicing 
debt."
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IV. 3. A BRADY PIAN?
(WDW/9/89 - 15 MARCH 1989)
Ever since Secretary of State Jeunes Baker III, last year, 
left the Treasury to join the campaign of then Vice-President 
Bush, there was "movement on the debt front" (WDW/2/89). There 
were several significant departures from "standard operating 
procedures." There were also signs of increasingly worrisome debt 
fatigue among the main debtors. Finally, there were statements 
from several prominent participants that indicated the direction 
of the coming movement, with President Bush himself calling for a 
"whole new look" at the debt problem.
Expectations mounted partly because the Treasury Department 
was mandated by the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 to submit on 
February 23, an interim report on the debt situation, that 
everybody expected would contain the new Administration's 
position.
Just one week before the deadline, the Treasury requested 
and received an extension of about three weeks for the 
presentation of the report. Of course, this only contributed to 
intensify the rumors that a thorough revision was under way.
In the beginning of March, the news of the Venezuelan riots 
tipped the scales in favor of making an early statement by the 
Department of the Treasury, even before the expiration of the 
extension of the deadline previously granted.
Thus, amidst insistent denials to assuage some of the 
mounting expectations, on March 10, Secretary of the Treasury 
Nicholas Brady went before the Bretton Woods Committee to 
announce the elements of an important shift in the position of 
the U.S. Administration with respect to the indebtedness of 
developing countries.
Secretary Brady began reviewing the fundamental principles 
of the prevailing strategy that, in his own terms, "remain 
sound," as well as some of its accomplishments. Nonetheless, 
Secretary Brady also admitted that there remained "serious 
problems and impediments to a successful resolution of the debt 
crisis." All these are called "realities" that cannot be denied 
and that demand a "strengthening of the current strategy," by 
means of the commitment and involvement of all parties.
The first mentioned are the "debtor nations," in a single 
paragraph that, rather unconventionally, contains very few 
demands. For instance, the debtors are asked to adopt policies to 
"encourage new investment flows, strengthen domestic savings, and 
promote the return of flight capital."
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The "creditor community," — the commercial banks, 
international financial institutions and creditor governments—  
are asked "to provide more effective and timely financial 
support," by means of adopting the following measures.
First, in a major departure, commercial banks are asked to 
provide a broader range of alternatives to achieve both debt and 
debt service reduction and to provide new lending." This is one 
of the more innovative aspects of the proposal.
The second "key element" deserves to be fully quoted. It 
proposes "the negotiation of a general waiver of the sharing and 
negative pledge clauses for each performing debtor, to permit an 
orderly process whereby banks which wish to do so, negotiate debt 
or debt service reduction transactions." The reason for this 
specific recommendation is spelled out also very clearly. It is 
considered that "the sharing and negative pledge clauses 
included in existing loan agreements are a substantial barrier to 
debt reduction."
Obviously, it is very difficult to anticipate the potential 
of this crucial ingredient. Even so, suffice it here to say that 
it may contribute to relax the rather strict discipline that 
apparently has prevailed among the commercial creditors. Among 
others, this has been one factor that has stunted the 
flourishing of the secondary debt market.
Third, besides promoting "sound policies" and catalyzing new 
financing, the international financial institutions are asked "to 
support and encourage debtor and commercial bank efforts to 
reduce debt and debt service burdens." This is to be done by 
means of providing funds, "as part of their policy-based lending 
programs, for debt and debt service reduction purposes."
Fourth, a quota increase for the IMF constitutes a major 
breakthrough, as well as a victory for its Managing Director 
— whose relations with Secretary Brady apparently experienced a 
bad start. To dismiss any speculation, it is hoped that "a 
consensus can be reached on the quota question before the end of 
the year."
Fifth, a single line on creditor governments, as Japan and 
other surplus governments, "which are in a position to provide 
additional financing in support of this effort may wish to 
consider doing so."
Sixth, the initial disbursements of the international 
financial institutions should not be delayed "until firm, 
detailed commitments have been provided by all other creditors," 
because often this has "served to provide a false sense of 
security rather than meaningful financial support." This last 
ingredient also contributes to a greater degree of flexibility.
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Finally, Secretary Brady states that the proposal's overall 
objective is "to rekindle the hope of the people and leaders of 
debtor nations and their sacrifices will lead to greater 
prosperity in the present and the prospect of a future unclouded 
by the burden of debt."
Evidently, all these ingredients do not amount to "a Brady 
Plan," but they do represent a major departure from the 
prevailing "strategy." The mention for the first time of the need 
for debt reduction, as well as the elements contributing to 
greater flexibility, together with the IMF's quota increase and 
the more active participation of surplus countries, by 
themselves, do not constitute a strategy. They are only 
meaningful steps in the right direction, whose details still have 
to be worked out.
IV. 4. MR CAMDESSUS AND THE BANKS 
(WDW/17/89 - 7 JUNE 1989)
Ever since Secretary of the Treasury Brady outlined the new 
proposals making debt reduction the central trait of the debt 
saga, it has become increasingly clear that, this time, the 
commercial banks are under the limelight.
The events have clustered around the ongoing negotiations 
between Mexico and its private creditors. Thus, the intense and 
variegated posturing, presently taking place, has to be pondered 
through the prism of the customary ritual that surrounds these 
negotiations.
One of the most recent and detailed descriptions of what can 
be expected, particularly from the IMF and the commercial 
creditors, was presented by the Managing Director of the IMF, in 
a timely speech made at the Institut d*Etudes Financières et 
Bancaires, in Paris, on May 31, 1989.
That Mr. Camdessus now is at the forefront of the new 
orientation constitutes in itself an auspicious change. Gone seem 
to be the days when the debtor governments were advised to spouse 
"a new realism." Only a year ago, Mr Camdessus asserted — of all 
places, in Caracas—  that "the urgency of action lies first and 
foremost, of course, with the indebted countries themselves," 
because they "need to be more steadfast in their efforts to deal 
with their imbalances and structural weaknesses." Debtors were 
then urged "to summon up the courage and determination to embark 
on stronger programs and to hold unswervingly to them."
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Attempting to draw a balance between the accomplishments and 
the shortcomings of the prevailing strategy, nonetheless, Mr. 
Camdessus recognizes that "the case-by-case approach" needs to be 
"set in motion again." For this purpose, he describes some of the 
main partners' responsibilities.
For the indebted countries, "there is no credible 
alternative to growth-oriented adjustment," but on the condition 
that it "must be financed." Otherwise, the Managing Director 
judges as "a mistake to ask these countries, implicitly or 
explicitly, to reduce their growth below potential in order to 
meet their debt commitments solely from their own resources." 
Furthermore, Mr. Camdessus considers "essential that while 
countries maintain service of their debt, they are not prevented 
from achieving satisfactory rates of investment by a lack of 
suitable financing." Because, in the end, "depressing investment 
merely serves to undercut the capacity to service debt in the 
future."
An enumeration of IMF's responsibilities leads Mr. Camdessus 
to recall something that is often forgotten. Under "the very 
first article of its charter," the Fund makes its resources 
available temporarily to its members "to correct maladjustments 
in their balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity."
A summary of the most recent adaptations experienced by the 
Fund's main instruments follows:
-Financing can now be granted for longer terms, "if 
necessary over four years," as well as "up to 270 or 330 percent 
of quota."
-"Access to Fund's resources might extend beyond those 
limits in exceptional cases," as it was recently done with 
Mexico.
-Special financing is now available for unforeseen 
situations or external shocks, such as terms of trade 
deterioration or interest rate increases, as with the case of the 
Philippines.
-Parallel financing from surplus countries, as agreed with 
Japan, is particularly welcome.
-Financial support will be provided "expeditiously," even if 
this means that the Fund will be the first disbursing party, as 
with Venezuela, the Philippines and Mexico. Furthermore, it is 
expressly recognized that this can lead to the unprecedented 
situation that the Fund's first disbursement is made while there 
still are outstanding arrears with the commercial banks. In such
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situations, "the lesser of two evils" is preferred, "to tolerate 
some accumulation of arrears on a temporary basis in the absence 
of bridging finance." The search for so-called "critical mass," 
is thus discarded, because the "concern to proceed with all 
caution has, with the passing of time, turned against its 
objectives." In other words, programs have failed when 
"significant time" elapsed before the debtor and the banks agreed 
on a package.
-Finally, Mr. Camdessus offers six arguments in support of 
using some of the Fund's resources for debt reduction: 1) "beyond 
a certain point, a debt overhang becomes a structural obstacle to 
growth;” 2) support can be granted for debt reduction when it is 
linked to medium-term adjustment programs; 3) since the Fund 
cannot provide guarantees against its resources, "reducing the 
stock of debt, rather than the interest burden," might be 
preferable, "because of its greater transparency and permanent 
nature;'1 4) a ceiling of 40 percent of a country's quota can be 
"set-aside," without representing an increase in access, for 
financing reductions in the stock of debt; 5) subsequent 
disbursements can be contingent on the satisfactory performance 
of debt reduction; and 6) as mentioned, initial disbursements 
will be made without delay, in the absence of full financing 
assurances from other creditors.
Having spelled out what the Fund stands ready to do, Mr. 
Camdessus requests from the commercial banks:
-More expeditious provision of bridge financing.
-Active participation in debt reduction.
-Those who want to disengage from sovereign lending should 
do it, at around market values.
-The large international banks are asked specifically "to 
increase their contribution to the strategy and to adjust 
their negotiating methods by complying with three 
conditions: 1) delaying negotiations will no longer
"induce the public sector to increase its contributions;"
2) the decision-making process should be "speeded-up;" and
3) the practice of observing the "lowest common 
denominator," should be forsaken.
No wonder, the powerful Chairman of Citicorp, Mr. John Reed, 
recently stated that this time the banks "are being asked to take 




V. 1. ONE DECADE OF ADJUSTMENT LENDING 
(WDW/13/89 - 10 MAY 1989)
The World Bank has issued an evaluation of ten years of 
adjustment lending, to serve as the basis for a discussion held 
during the Spring meetings of the Development Committee, in 
Washington from March 31 to April 4 (WDW/10/89).
Introduced in 1980, as a response to the balance of payments 
problems of developing countries caused by what is known as "the 
second oil shock,” adjustment lending has become increasingly 
important for World Bank operations. By the end of 1988, it 
accounted for more than 10 percent of the whole Bank portfolio 
and for 25 percent of new annual lending commitments. Through FY 
1988, adjustment lending operations amounted to US$19.9 billion, 
distributed in loans to fifty five countries.
These loans have been granted primarily to low-income, 
sub-Saharan countries, as well as to highly-indebted, middle 
income countries. For instance, during FY 1988, 53 percent of the 
World Bank's total adjustment lending commitments were for 
highly-indebted, middle income countries. Furthermore, Latin 
America is the region that has received the highest proportion of 
adjustment loans, representing 42 percent of total lending 
commitments. By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa has received 33 
percent, while Asia only amounted to 10 percent.
To confront an adverse external shock, the Bank sees at 
least two basic types of policy response. The first, called 
adjustment, seeks to attain stabilization, understood as "managed 
reductions in expenditures" to bring about orderly reductions of 
domestic demand to the levels of available external resources. 
The other policy response is called structural adjustment, 
understood as "changes in relative prices and institutions 
designed to make the economy more efficient, more flexible, and 
better able to use resources and thereby to engineer sustainable 
long-term growth."
Additionally, the Bank recognizes that other responses may 
also be available to confront adverse external shocks. First, the 
need to adjust can be postponed by borrowing abroad, which was 
the response that prevailed during the seventies. A second option 
is described as "to increase domestic controls and the inward
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orientation of the economy," but this is dismissed as "likely to 
be costly in terms of efficiency and growth."
The differences between traditional project lending and 
structural adjustment lending were specified since the beginning, 
in a memorandum dated 5 February 1980. Adjustment lending was 
viewed as "a fundamental instrument for the dialogue between the 
Bank and the country on various aspects of development policy." 
Also, finance would be provided "over a number of years in direct 
support of specific policy reforms." Finally, foreign exchange 
would be made available, "to finance imports not linked in 
advance to specific investment programs."
There are two main instruments of adjustment lending: 
structural adjustment loans (SALs) and sector adjustment loans 
(SECALs) . The main difference between them is "more by the 
breadth of policy and institutional reforms in a particular 
operation than by the nature of the reforms themselves."
On one side, SALs are said to have "generally supported 
programs to increase domestic resource mobilization and to 
improve efficiency, through reforms of trade policy, changes in 
prices and regulations in key productive sectors, increases in 
government revenues, and changes in the size and composition of 
government recurrent and capital expenditures."
By contrast, SECALs are focused on a single sector and 
support "policy reforms with considerable macroeconomic impact," 
such as trade or financial sector reforms; reforms of sectoral 
pricing, institutions, and public expenditure composition; as 
well as "more narrowly focused programs such as input pricing 
(for instance, the elimination of fertilizer subsidies).1
In the end, all SALs and SECALs provide balance of payments 
support, by means of quick disbursements to finance general 
imports. The conditions basically consist of meeting the agreed 
policy targets within certain time periods. Thus, to facilitate 
monitoring and to ensure that the conditions are met, all the 
disbursements are tranched.
The main objective of any structural adjustment program is 
"to restore sustainable economic growth and make progress in 
poverty alleviation." Also, admittedly, "many adjustment programs 
need a stabilization component to restore the internal 
macroeconomic balance." And even when "economic performance is 
what ultimately matters," the conditionality of these loans "does 
not directly specify economic performance but rather calls for 
policy changes and institutional reforms that are under the 
direct control of the borrower."
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The Bank admits that several concerns and criticisms have 
been voiced in different quarters about adjustment lending, as 
follows: 1) inadequacies in program design, as well as in their 
poverty impact; 2) difficulties in program implementation; 3) 
over-optimistic assumptions about the external environment and 
about burden sharing by commercial lenders; 4) the impact of 
adjustment lending on the Bank's portfolio; and 5) the need for 
greater diplomacy and coordination among all parties involved 
— the borrower, the Bank, the IMF, and other creditors.
To address these issues, the study focuses on the following 
three topics: performance under adjustment; an evaluation of 
policy reforms; and the design and implementation of adjustment 
operations.
Briefly, it is found that the average performance — measured 
by GDP growth, investment/GDP, export growth, real exchange rate, 
current account balance/GDP, budget balance/GDP, inflation, 
external debt/exports, and debt service/ exports—  of 30
countries, out of 55 recipients of adjustment lending, has been 
better than that of those that did not receive such support, 
within this group, the performance of 12 countries that have 
received three or more adjustment loans was the most successful.
Regarding policy reforms, the general conclusion is that 
"external sector policies and price policies have been reformed
in significant measure. Progress has been less visible in
institutional and non-price areas, as well as in aspects of 
pricing policies that require institutionalization of the
changes."
The Bank finds that "there has been considerable success in 
implementing conditionality." On the basis of the data gathered 
for 15 countries, it is found that "60 percent of all conditions 
were fully implemented during the loan disbursement period." If 
the category "substantial progress" is added to "full 
implementation," this percentage increases to 84 and 89 percent. 
Nonetheless, degrees of implementation vary significantly across 
different policy areas, ranging from 53 percent in fiscal policy 
to 79 percent in energy policy. Furthermore, the most crucial 
factors for implementation are: tranching, government commitment, 
the quality of Bank advice, and the external economic 
environment.
As an overall conclusion, in comparison with traditional 
project-investment loans, the Bank admits that since "the 
potential benefits from structural adjustment lending are great, 
the losses can also be substantial when it is poorly executed." 
In these terms, adjustment lending is characterized as "a high
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risk as well as a high reward activity." This feature is 
offered, "together with the continued need for physical and
human infrastructure investment in developing countries," to 
justify "the Bank's continued reliance on projects for the 
majority of its development lending."
V. 2. FTNANCTAL SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT 
(WDW/21/89 - 5 JULY 1989)
The second part of this year's World Development Report is 
dedicated to the role of financial systems in development, the 
first part was reviewed separately (WDW/20/89).
In eight chapters, this lengthy second part of the Report is 
full of colorful pie charts and bar diagrams, to illustrate 
subjects such as financial savings and the real deposit rate in 
Argentina and Thailand, or central government borrowing by 
source, as well as sleek boxes describing financial swindles, 
life without money, trade financing in Renaissance Italy, how 
good bankers become bad bankers, or credit and income 
distribution in Costa Rica.
The Report's breadth can be better appreciated in the 
chapter titles: why does finance matter?; the evolution of
financial systems; financial sector issues in developing 
countries; financial systems in distress; foundations of 
financial systems; developing financial systems; issues in 
informal finance; and toward more liberal and open financial 
systems.
The justification given in the foreword by President Barber 
Conable for focusing on this subject is that "the decline in 
foreign capital inflows means that countries will need to rely 
primarily on domestic resources to finance investment."
The Report * s central message is that the financial systems 
of developing countries, although some more than others, are in 
need of reform and liberalization. This is considered an 
essential step, to enable their participation in the gradual 
process of integration between domestic and world financial 
markets, already taking place throughout the world.
This central message rests on the underlying assumption 
that, from those experiences of financial reform already 
undertaken, several lessons can be withdrawn that allow for the 
clear identification of the different stages of what in effect 
amounts to a process of universal liberalization. This blueprint 
for the reform of financial systems, is contained in the
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concluding chapter of the Report. dealing with how to evolve 
"toward more liberal and open financial systems."
From recent experiences, such as those of the Latin American 
Southern Cone, the Philippines and Turkey, as well as in other 
countries such as Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and the 
United States, a list of so-called "lessons of reform" is 
derived. This serves as the basis for identifying the main 
"components of financial reform," as well as the sequencing of 
different stages to move "from a regulated to a more liberal 
financial system."
First of all the lessons: 1) the "clearest lesson" is that 
"reforms carried out against an unstable macroeconomic 
background" may worsen instability; 2) where "prices are 
distorted owing to protection or price controls, financial 
liberalization may not improve the allocation of resources," it 
may even "make matters worse by causing the financial system to 
respond more flexibly to bad signals," consequently, "exchange 
rate realignments and reforms in trade and public enterprise 
should precede, or at least happen along with, financial 
liberalization;" 3) regulation and supervision "by bank 
management, by market forces, and by public authorities are all 
necessary to reduce recklessness and fraud," this amounts to 
replacing "direct intervention" with "adequate prudential 
regulation;" and 4) "the authorities must anticipate how reforms 
will change relative prices and how these changes will affect 
different groups."
These lessons allow for the identification of the main 
components of financial liberalization and reform. First, 
macroeconomic stability demands "reducing public deficits to a 
level that can be financed by means other than inflation or other 
taxes on the financial sector." The conclusion is derived that 
"to the extent that a government finances its deficit 
domestically, borrowing from a securities market is therefore 
preferable to forced borrowing from financial institutions, which 
in turn is preferable to borrowing from the central bank."
Second, progress has to be made in "establishing 
macroeconomic stability, liberalizing industry, and restructuring 
the financial system" before moving into a "thoroughgoing 
liberalization of interest rates."
Third, directed credit should be at least gradually 
dismantled by means of limiting the number of priority sectors 
and eliminating the difference between subsidized and market 
interest rates. In the end, "sectors that require large subsidies 
should be dealt with in the budget, not through credit 
allocation."
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Fourth, institutional restructuring, besides the 
privatization of public banks, "should not be limited to the 
reform of the banking system but should seek to develop a more 
broadly based financial system that will include money and 
capital markets and nonbank intermediaries."
Lastly, external financial policy should be part of the 
process of reform, focusing particularly on the entry of foreign 
financial institutions and the scale and intensity of capital 
flows.
The sequencing of these components of financial 
liberalization leads to the identification of three stages in the 
path toward reform.
The initial stage starts by "getting the fiscal deficit 
under control and establishing macroeconomic stability." 
Simultaneously, directed credit should be scaled down and the 
level and pattern of interest rates should be brought "into line 
with inflation and other market forces." Also, during this stage, 
some improvement should be accomplished in what are called "the 
foundations of finance — that is, the accounting and legal 
systems, procedures for the enforcement of contracts, disclosure 
requirements, and the structure of prudential regulation and 
supervision." Finally, it is suggested that "measures to improve 
efficiency in the real sector — that is, more liberal policies 
toward trade and industry—  also ought to be taken at an early 
stage."
The intermediate stage should see the promotion of "a 
greater variety of markets and institutions and to foster 
competition." Also, on the external side, "foreign entry into 
domestic financial markets should be encouraged to increase 
competition and efficiency — but perhaps with restrictions until 
domestic institutions are able to compete fully." Nonetheless, 
"it will probably be necessary to maintain controls on the 
movement of capital."
The final stage is characterized as "full liberalization of 
interest rates, the elimination of the remaining directed credit 
programs, the relaxation of capital controls, and the removal of 
restrictions on foreign institutions."
Finally, the suggested sequence of these changes advises 
that "trade transactions should be liberalized first and capital 
movements later." Additionally, "external reform should wait 
until internal reform and the domestic financial system have been 
liberalized and deepened."
Even when it is recognized that quickness, as well as 
gradualism, may impose heavy losses, the cost of "undue delay" is 
higher because it leads to "perpetuating the inefficiencies of
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financial repression." Nonetheless, instead of venturing into 
suggesting an optimal pace for reform, the Report asserts that 
"the appropriate balance must be judged in each case." Because, 
admittedly, "here, at any rate, generalization is not helpful."
This conclusion is rather surprising, because it allows the 
reader to wonder if the implementation of financial 
liberalization, according to a single blueprint supposedly valid 
for all developing countries, in itself, is not extremely 
resilient to generalization.
V. 3. SOUL SEARCHING ON ADJUSTMENT LENDING 
(WDW/26/89 - 13 SEPTEMBER 1989)
The World Bank has published a follow-up to its evaluation 
of "a decade of adjustment lending" (WDW/13/89), originally 
presented at this year's spring meetings of the Development 
Committee.
On 19 September 1988, an internal conference was held to 
discuss the results of this evaluation. A summary of the 
discussion was published, in July 1989, under the title 
Adjustment Lending. How It Has Worked. How It Can be Improved, by 
Vinod Thomas, chief of the Trade Policy Division of the Country 
Economics Department and by A jay Chubbier, a senior economist in 
the Office of the Vice President for Development Economics.
Some of the concerns about adjustment lending, expressed by 
different participants in the conference, are summarized under 
five headings.
First, in the design of adjustment programs, the following 
flaws should be avoided: 1) conflicting goals in different areas, 
such as seeking simultaneously domestic demand cuts, shifts to 
tradables and reductions of inefficiencies; 2) excessive 
austerity that frequently hurts the poorest; and 3) ideologically 
driven, instead of tailor-made policy packages.
Second, the implementation of adjustment programs should 
avoid: 1) inadequate follow-up arrangements, which undermine the 
credibility and sustainability of reforms; as well as 2) over- 
optimistic expectations about the willingness of interest groups 
to give up their rents in pursuit of national efficiency.
Third, the following external conditions should be carefully 
assessed: 1) global economic projections should not be
overestimated; 2) inadequate burden sharing arrangements among 
creditors, because they may lead to under-funding; and 3) World
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Bank disbursements should not be used to repay and bail out 
commercial banks.
Fourth, Bank lending should avoid: 1) open-ended sectoral
and structural operations that transfer resources to countries 
that are not adjusting; 2) weak conditionality, because it does 
not improve economic performance and hence creditworthiness; and
3) increased risks to the Bank's portfolio.
Finally, on the coordination with other lenders, the Bank 
should: 1) promote a non-confrontational and effective process of 
coordination among lenders; and 2) arrive at a clearer division 
of labor with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The discussion about the impact of adjustment programs dealt 
with measurement difficulties. For instance, it was admitted that 
comparisons between the performance of adjustment lending 
countries (AL) and non-adjustment lending countries (NAL) can be 
biased, because differences in performance may be a result of 
differences in starting positions.
Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
impact of an adjustment program and the contribution made by Bank 
operations associated with such program. To claim credit, more 
precision is needed to identify and assess the mechanisms through 
which Bank operations directly contribute to positive results.
Finally, it was concluded that adjustment programs have been 
"moderately successful," although because "definite conclusions 
are not possible," admittedly, such a "claim is a matter of 
judgment." Doubts were also raised about what was seen as "the 
most convincing evidence," that AL countries "have performed 
significantly better than average, despite their larger external 
shocks." An alternative explanation was suggested, because 
sometimes "the Bank has been willing to maintain its lending only 
to the countries that are doing well."
The extent of policy reforms reveals that "countries 
suffering similar external shocks may perform quite differently 
under adjustment programs," and also that policy reforms have 
"varied across policy areas."
Briefly, the trade balance of most adjusting countries has 
"improved substantially," although "in some cases, this 
improvement was attributable mostly to the lack of import 
financing." Also, in several countries the exchange rate was 
"depreciated significantly," with a "strong" response in export 
volumes. In general, the conclusion was drawn that "external 
sector policies and price policies have been reformed," while 
"less visible" progress was found in institutional and non-price 
areas and in aspects of price policies that require institutional 
changes.
81
Three prerequisites were identified for adjustment lending:
1) the country must have an overall adjustment program; 2) the 
government must own the program; and 3) the program must be 
politically and financially realistic.
The program's ownership was questioned because "opposition 
to reform programs usually exists both inside and outside the 
government," hence, it was judged more relevant to answer the 
question of "how to strengthen the hand of reformers." Also,if 
these prerequisites are "applied too rigidly, the Bank might miss 
the opportunity of supporting policy changes that sometimes 
develop in hesitant steps before the benefits of the program are 
revealed." In these matters, "subjective judgments, therefore, 
are often necessary."
To conclude, certain areas of broad agreement were 
enumerated: 1) the three prerequisites received broad support, as 
principles applicable to the consideration and actual practice of 
adjustment lending; 2) "so far," adjustment lending "has been 
reasonably successful,11 although it was also admitted that "much 
more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation will be needed if the 
effectiveness of such lending is to be judged;" 3) admitting that 
"the social costs of adjustment deserve greater attention," it 
was specifically recognized that "government programs that 
clearly benefit the poor should be protected during adjustment;"
4) lending conditions should be more focused, simpler and 
realistic; 5) given "the risks of adjustment lending and the 
limited capabilities for design and implementation, some limits 
on lending levels are desirable." Consequently, for purposes of 
"portfolio management," 25 percent as an overall limit was judged 
"reasonable."
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VI. MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
VI. 1. THE WORLD BANK-IMF SPRING MEETINGS 
(WDW/10/89 - 19 APRIL 1989)
This year, the Bank-Fund Spring meetings, held in Washington 
from March 31 to April 4, were dominated by the indebtedness of 
developing countries. In this way, the meetings responded 
partially to the mounting expectations generated by Secretary 
Brady's presentation, on March 10 before the Bretton Woods 
Committee, of what was immediately recognized as an important 
shift in the orientation of the prevailing strategy (WDW/9/89).
In effect, the Bank-Fund Spring meetings were seen as the 
most adequate opportunity to clarify several details about how 
the objective of debt reduction would be achieved.
Admittedly, several important details remained deliberately 
unspecified. Among others, Leonard Silk, in The New York Times 
mentioned the following: first, how debt reduction would take 
place and how much would be reduced; second, from where would 
come the money for debt reductions; third, how would the burden 
of risk be distributed among the different participants; fourth, 
which debtor countries would qualify; fifth, what would be the 
role of each one of the four participants— the debtor 
governments, the commercial banks, the creditor governments and 
the multilateral financial institutions.
Obviously, as expressed in the rather arcane communiques 
solemnly issued at the conclusion of the different meetings, the 
results remained far short of fulfilling most of these 
expectations. Nonetheless, some important results were attained.
First of all, the most important outcome consisted in the 
mandate issued by the Interim and the Development Committees to 
the Executive Boards of the Bank and the Fund. Both were 
instructed to consider as "a matter of urgency," as well as "to 
move expeditiously," to design and implement "specific proposals" 
to achieve the objective of "debt alleviation."
Secretary Brady's remarks at the Interim Committee meeting 
had anticipated that this would be as far as the present meetings 
would go. He said that "in order to move ahead to strengthen the 
debt strategy, it is vital that the Interim and Development 
Committees give clear direction to the IMF and World Bank 
Executive Boards." He also urged "both Boards to consider
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promptly needed changes in Fund and Bank policies in order that 
new mechanisms could be put in place."
This was the conclusion finally adopted, despite the 
unprecedented emergence, in the open, of differences among the 
industrialized countries, in the form of a rift within the Group 
of Seven, integrated by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
On one side, the proposals of France, Japan and the United 
States were lumped together. The Interim Committee "welcomed the 
fact that new proposals had been made by several countries 
— including France and Japan, and most recently by the Secretary 
of the U.S. Treasury—  designed to strengthen the debt strategy 
and to place greater emphasis on debt and debt service 
reduction."
In almost the same terms, the Development Committee 
"welcomed the fact that new proposals had been made by France, 
Japan and, more recently, by the U.S. to review and strengthen 
the current strategy through stronger emphasis on a broader-based 
approach to voluntary debt and debt service reduction, new 
investment, adjustment measures, the repatriation of flight 
capital, together with new lending by commercial banks."
On the other side, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom questioned certain aspects of 
the new proposals. As Paul Blustein said in The Washington Post, 
the representatives of these countries "played the role of skunks 
at a picnic." For instance, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. 
Niger Lawson, voiced concern that "taxpayers would end up holding 
the bag for the banks' bad loans." Also, the Dutch Finance 
Minister, Mr. Onno Ruding, said the risk was that the proposal 
would cost the Fund and the Bank "staggering amounts of money."
In the end, this rift was patched up, as revealed by the 
wording of the two communiques. Although it may only mean that 
some of these differences were left to be resolved down the road.
The second major achievement of the meetings was the 
announcement that the Japanese Government is ready to offer $4.5 
billion in parallel financing to Fund arrangements arrived at 
within the new framework for debt reduction. Although, this 
amount was less than rumored, its announcement constitutes the 
most concrete expression of support thus far received by the new 
proposals.
Thirdly, there was an apparent solution to the differences 
existent between the Fund and the Bank in their lending 
activities to heavily indebted countries. For instance, the 
Interim Committee "emphasized the central part that continued to
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be played by the Fund In finding solutions to the debt problem." 
Even so, it was also added that it considered "important that the 
World Bank play its commensurate role in the strategy," 
concluding that both institutions should "work in close 
collaboration on these matters."
Before jumping to the conclusion that this statement marks 
the end of the latest skirmishes that have flared among the Bank 
and the Fund, it is necessary to have access to the yet 
unreleased agreement between the staffs of both, which still has 
to be submitted to the ratification of the two institutions' 
Executive Boards.
Another important result was the agreement reached about the 
Fund's Ninth General Review of Quotas. Secretary Brady, in the 
Bretton Woods speech, expressed hope that "a consensus can be 
reached on the quota question before the end of the year." In 
almost the same terms, the Interim Committee "urged the Executive 
Board to complete its work on the Ninth Review with a view to a 
decision on this matter by the Board of Governors before the end 
of this year."
Japan, with the second largest economy in the world, holds 
only 4.53% of the voting shares at the IMF, ranking fifth behind 
the United States, with 19.14%, Great Britain, West Germany and 
France. Apparently, the Europeans raised no objection to Japan's 
accession to the number two position in the Fund— a position it 
already holds at the World Bank. Thus, the Interim Committee 
agreed that "the size and distribution of any quota increase 
should take into account changes in the world economy since the 
last review of quotas as well as members' relative positions in 
the world economy and the need to maintain a balance between 
different groups of countries."
To sum up, the indebtedness of developing countries topped 
the agenda of this year's Bank-Fund Spring meetings, with the 
mandate given to the Executive Directors of both institutions to 
implement the general guidelines as their most concrete result. 
Other results consisted in Japan's offer to contribute to debt 
reduction activities and the agreement about the quota increase 
for the IMF, as well as the undisclosed terms of the settlement 
of differences agreed between the Bank and the Fund.
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VI. 2. THE IDB'S SEVENTH REPLENIS:
(WDW/11/89 - 26 APRIL 1989)
After three years of Intense, protracted and sometimes 
acrimonious negotiations, on March 22, at the conclusion of the 
thirtieth annual meeting of the Board of Governors, it was 
announced that agreement had been reached on the seventh general 
increase in resources of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB).
These lengthy negotiations, in the middle of a decade of 
dismal performance by the Latin American and Caribbean economies 
— only comparable to the thirties—  took a severe toll on the 
Bank's performance.
For instance, 1988 was the fourth consecutive year of 
decline in loan authorizations by the Bank. These reached a 
record low of US$1.6 billion, after the peak of $3.5 billion 
attained in 1984, representing the lowest level since 1976.
Not all the results in these years have been negative. In 
1988, disbursements increased from $1.9 billion in 1987 to $2.3 
billion. Also, 217 projects of grant and contingent technical 
cooperation were approved in 1988, amounting to $55.7 million, by 
contrast to the $47 million approved in 1987.
Two positions emerged when the negotiations on the seventh 
replenishment began, during the twenty seventh annual meeting of 
the Board of Governors, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, on 20-26 
March 1987. On one side were those who favored a smaller bank, 
but less tied to the conditions set by the largest contributor, 
with fewer resources and consequently less lending capability. On 
the other side were those who considered necessary the approval 
of the replenishment and thus favored a larger and more vigorous 
bank for the next decade.
The confrontation between these two positions led to a 
deadlock that resulted, at the beginning of 1988, in the 
resignation of the previous President, Mr. Antonio Ortiz Mena. In 
the end, apparently, everybody agreed with the need for a larger 
and better endowed institution, although profound differences 
persisted about the conditions.
The succeeding President Enrique Iglesias reflected this 
consensus in his address to the annual meeting of the Board of 
Governors, held in Caracas from 21 to 23 March 1988. He said that 
the alternative of a small Bank, nourished only by the repayments 
of previous loans, did not constitute a viable hypothesis in the 
medium term, because the Bank should not become a net financial 
burden for the region. He concluded that "nobody should forget
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that the essential goal of the institution should be to 
facilitate the net transfer of resources from the industrialized 
countries to the developing countries of the region."
The divergence about the conditions for the seventh 
replenishment pitted the United States, as the Bank's largest 
contributor, against the four relatively more developed 
countries of Latin America — Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela. The negotiations were conducted within the committee 
of the Board of Governors, with the rest of the members assuming 
a relatively less active role.
The results accomplished, only until the last moments of the 
annual meeting of the Board of Governors, held in Amsterdam, from 
20 to 22 March, illustrate the main points of contention.
First of all, on the amount of the resource increase, it was 
agreed that the Bank's capital will increase by $26.5 billion, to 
enable lending amounting to $22.5 billion, during 1990-1993. 
Despite its magnitude, the resource increase itself was not the 
most contentious issue.
Second, it was agreed that the Bank would incorporate a new 
kind of lending operation to its portfolio, with 25 percent of 
the Bank's total resources dedicated to sector lending. Since the 
IDB has never performed policy lending, during a transition 
period of two years, sector loans will be made jointly with the 
World Bank, at the initiative of either. The purpose of sector 
lending has been described as to improve economic efficiency in 
an entire sector of a country's economy, rather than the 
execution of individual projects. Among the targets of these 
loans are policy improvements, institutional strengthening, new 
operational approaches and technological development.
Third, operational guidelines were also agreed about the 
foreign exchange component allocated to specific projects, 
differentiating among groups of countries, as follows: for the 
most developed countries— Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela— 50 percent; intermediate countries— Colombia, Chile 
and Peru— 60 percent; countries with limited markets— Bahamas, 
Barbados, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tabago and 
Uruguay— 70 percent; and the less developed countries— Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Dominican Republic— 80 percent.
Fourth, during 1990-1993, 65 percent of total Bank lending 
will be available for the group of the most developed and 
intermediate borrowers, while the rest will go to those 
borrowers with limited markets and the less developed countries.
Fifth, the lending priorities agreed specify that the Bank 
will continue ensuring that one half of its lending will
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benefit lower income groups. Also, environmental protection, the 
role of women in development and small entrepreneurs were singled 
out as priority sectors.
Sixth, new decision-making rules for loan approvals were 
also agreed, as follows: the vote of one executive director can 
delay for two months the consideration of a loan by the Board of 
Directors; two votes are reguired for a delay of seven months; 
and the votes of three executive directors are necessary to delay 
the consideration of a loan for twelve months.
Finally, the recommendations of a report presented by a 
High-Level Review Committee, in May 1988, guided the 
implementation of a process of basic reforms in the Bank's 
internal structure and organization. One of the main consequences 
of this process was the early and voluntary retirement of around 
150 professional staff members, or almost 10 percent of the whole 
staff.
Looking ahead, it is projected that Latin America and the 
Caribbean will grow, between 1990 and 1993, at an estimated 
yearly rate of between 4.5 and 5.5 percent. This assumes that the 
region will have access to net external financial resources 
amounting to between $20 and $25 billion yearly, of which 
external borrowing will amount to between $14 and $19 billion per 
year. Within these parameters, it is expected that the IDB will 
accomplish an average level of net lending of between $1.8 to 
$2.25 billion a year, corresponding to gross annual lending 
levels of $3.2 billion to $3.6 billion.
In these terms, the proportion of multilateral bank lending 
provided by the IDB should not be less than the historical figure 
of 40 to 50 percent. However, in order to attain approximately 9 
to 16% of the net foreign credit disbursements reguired by the 
region, according to the lending projections mentioned 
previously, the total approval of loans by the IDB, during the 
1990-1993 period, would have to amount to between $20 and $25 
billion.
Given the magnitudes involved, the complexity of the
negotiations, as well as the duration of the deadlock, the 
results were considered a personal triumph for the Bank's
President. He was credited with achieving a compromise that
satisfied some of the demands of the largest contributor to the 
Bank's capital, without affecting the institution's multilateral 
character.
Asked to compare the IDB negotiations with those that
launched the Uruguay Round, where he also played a pivotal role, 
President Iglesias declared that the replenishment had been "more 
difficult" and "more emotional," because "it was like husband and 
wife."
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VI. 3. THE BANK AND THE FUND MAKE UP 
(WDW/14/89 - 17 MAY 1989)
As it was hinted by the Interim Committee, have at the 
conclusion of its Spring meetings, the Bank and the Fund patched 
up their most recent differences (WDW/10/89).
The new guidelines for "enhanced collaboration" are 
contained in a memorandum addressed jointly by the Managing 
Director and the President, on March 30, to the Executive Board 
of the IMF and the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank. The 
purpose of these guidelines is "to avoid administrative friction 
and facilitate orderly resolution of differences of views." 
This is not the first time that it is necessary to arrive at an 
explicit settlement of differences between these two 
international financial institutions that, theoretically, are 
expected to lead more than a harmonious existence.
The first set of guidelines dates from 1966, with additional 
procedures approved in 1970, as well as new guidelines agreed by 
the managers in 1980 and by the Boards, in 1984 for the Fund and 
in 1985 for the Bank. This only proves that these procedures 
periodically demand revisions and realignments.
Before getting to the details of the new procedures, there 
is a description, in accordance with existing guidelines, of each 
institution's "primary responsibility." The Bank is entrusted 
with the composition and appropriateness of development programs 
and project evaluation, including development priorities." The 
Fund is responsible for "exchange rates and restrictive systems, 
for adjustment of temporary balance of payments diseguilibria, 
and for evaluating and assisting members to work out 
stabilization programs."
Admittedly, "in between these two clear-cut areas of 
responsibility," there is "a broad range of matters which are of 
interest to both institutions." Among them, the following are 
specifically mentioned: financial institutions, money and capital 
markets, domestic savings, the financial implications of economic 
development programs and foreign debt problems.
An obligation of mutual information about their respective 
areas of primary responsibility has also existed, with the 
specific provision that both institutions will not "engage in a 
critical review of these matters with member countries without 
the prior consent" of the other.
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Despite these rules, "growing contiguity," as well as 
"overlap of activities," have taken place. Another way of saying 
that the dividing line between both institutions has become 
increasingly blurred.
The Fund, for instance, "increased its consideration of 
structural issues in stand-by agreements; extended the repayment 
period of certain arrangements for 10 years; and introduced the 
concessional and relatively long-term Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF)."
For its part, the Bank "introduced Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SALs) in 1980 that provided financing in support of
policies to promote structural, economy-wide changes and, 
subsequently, Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs), which focused on 
structural changes in specific sectors."
As a result, significant differences have emerged "about 
country priorities and policy," and perhaps more worrisome "they 
have spilled into discussions by the staff with country 
authorities." These differences have appeared in the following 
areas: exchange rates; the level of external assistance; the
speed of adjustment; the levels of public sector development 
expenditures; the trade-off between efficiency and balance of
payments and budgetary impacts.
In conclusion, it is deemed "essential to strengthen
collaboration, to ensure that conflicts of views are resolved at
an early stage, do not surface in contacts with country 
authorities, and do not result in differing policy advice to 
member countries."
Accordingly, the following "procedures for enhanced 
collaboration" are spelled out:
1) Regular meetings between Bank Regional Vice Presidents 
and the corresponding Fund Area Department Directors will try to 
settle major differences. For those that remain unsolved, the 
Deputy Managing Director of the Fund and the Senior Vice 
President, Operations, of the Bank will chair senior level 
meetings on countries of common concern. If necessary, the 
Managing Director and the President will deal with any other 
differences, during their monthly and ad-hoc meetings. Also, the 
Fund's Director of Research and the Bank's Vice President, 
Development Economics, will direct "ad hoc study groups to 
examine analytical issues which may arise in the areas of common 
work."
2) The policy framework paper (PFP) discussions with 
low-income countries will "continue to be handled jointly," with 
"a single mission chief and on the basis of pre-agreed terns of
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reference." Additionally, parallel missions in the field are 
expected "to cooperate fully and meet jointly with the country 
authorities, following positions clearly agreed on in advance." 
Finally, if eligible countries agree, staff members from the 
other institution will be attached to missions involving the use 
of Fund SAF/ESAF or Bank SALs/SECALs.
3) Since "adjustment lending operations are not normally 
undertaken, unless an appropriate Fund arrangement is in place," 
the Bank will continue including "a discussion of the Fund's 
financial relations, the status of any negotiations for the use 
of Fund resources and the results of any recent Fund reviews in 
the President's Report to the Bank's Executive Board on a 
proposed adjustment loan." Even so, the need to strengthen 
coordination is considered "particularly strong," in those cases 
where there is no outstanding agreement with the other 
institution.
4) Regarding the suggestion that a "policy framework paper" 
be drafted for some middle-income countries, it was agreed that 
"this matter would be presented to the Executive Boards for 
consideration after further consultations between the two staffs 
and managements."
5) The case of a country with overdue obligations to one or 
both institutions should be reviewed in light of its capacity to 
discharge its obligations to the other institution.
6) Since the Executive Directors of both institutions have 
stressed "the need to avoid cross-conditionality," the ultimate 
decision about access to the resources of both rests with the 
Executive Board of each institution. If, in spite of reservations 
about policies or of outstanding arrears with the other 
institution, a program is submitted for approval, the case will 
be presented to an informal meeting of the Executive Board, 
before communicating the decision to the country concerned.
7) To avoid "conflicting views from being expressed" to 
other organizations, such as the OECD, or the UN, "to the 
maximum extent feasible, the draft report prepared by either 
institution will be sent to the other well in advance of the 
circulation date for review and comments."
8) Finally, for the long-term promotion of mutual 
understanding and "to better acquaint staff of the two 
institutions with the thinking practices and constraints within 
which each institution operates," an exchange program was agreed 
for two or three year secondments of senior professionals.
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This is a brief summary of the terms of understanding for 
the enhanced coordination of the activities of these multilateral 
financial institutions. There remains to be seen how long they 
will last this time, before "growing contiguity" demands another 
revision.
VI. 4. RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD BANK 
(WDW/15/89 - 24 MAY 1989)
During fiscal year 1988, the World Bank devoted $23.5 
million to economic and social research. Of this amount, $18.4 
million accounted for 89 staff-years of research, with the 
remaining $5.1 million dedicated to finance support activities, 
such as consultants, travel, computer time and research 
assistance. Also, as in 1986 and 1987, research activities 
represented 3.1 percent of the Bank's overall administrative 
expenses.
Under "research," the Bank includes centrally funded, as 
well as departmentally funded activities, that differ from 
"economic and sector work," because they are "not driven 
primarily by the immediate needs of Bank operations."
The breakdown between these categories remained almost 
unchanged. Centrally approved projects are those reviewed by the 
Research Committee and funded from the Central Research Budget, 
amounting to 49 percent of total research expenditures. 
Departmentally approved projects are those that departments 
undertake with their own resources, amounting to 51 percent of 
the total.
By subject, the breakdown of research activities funded 
throughout FY 88 was as follows: human resource development
(22%); natural resource development (20%); public and private 
sector policies, as well as adjustment programs (13% each); 
financing development, as well as external sector and debt 
management (10% each); finally, technology and development (2%). 
The remaining was dedicated to coordination, publication and 
dissemination (5%).
The Bank broadly defines research as those activities 
destined to the creation of new knowledge, with the dual purpose 
of "improving the Bank's operations and policy advice" and 
"increasing understanding of the process of economic 
development."
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The accomplishment of these objectives demands the 
performance of several tasks, such as those of a consulting firm, 
a think tank, an academic institution, a statistical office and 
an information service.
Consulting activities consist of analytical work in support 
of Bank operations, that generates new knowledge about the 
economies of member countries.
As a think tank, the Bank undertakes studies of operations 
that yield "best practice" advice, as well as "the development 
and implementation of specific tools," such as models of 
adjustment and growth or of the consequences of current global 
economic trends.
Academic research at the Bank expands understanding of the 
development process, without necessarily yielding specific and 
immediate operational advice or guidance. It differs from 
strictly academic research, because it is "clearly directed 
toward a recognized policy issue that eventually will yield 
improved policy advice."
Finally, data gathering activities correspond to those of a 
statistical bureau, while the dissemination of research products 
entails the activities of an information service.
The Bank's operational needs basically demand consulting and 
think-tank types of research. Nonetheless, the Bank attempts to 
go further. Striving "to provide intellectual leadership in the 
field of development economics," leads it "to compete on an even 
footing with the larger academic community." Thus, endowed with 
what is described as "the largest single group of development 
researchers in the world," the Bank claims to be "a leading 
center, perhaps the leading center, for development economics."
Furthermore, two main activities promote the interaction 
between academic and Bank researchers. First, a Visiting Research 
Fellow Program for outstanding researchers. And second, an annual 
Bank conference on development economics, the first of which was 
held only two weeks ago. The purpose of these activities is "to 
increase the intellectual traffic on the two-way street between 
Bank staff and the outside academic community, exposing each to 
the work and research issues of the other."
Specific research priorities are reflected in the activities 
of the two vice-presidencies that exist under the Senior 
Vice-president for policy, planning and research (PAR). Under 
the development economics Vice-presidency the priorities are: 
macroeconomic adjustment and sustainable growth; institutional 
capacity and economic growth; international trade; and the debt 
problem. Under the Vice-presidency for sector policy and research
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the priorities are: ecological sustainability; poverty reduction; 
the role of women in development; competition and the private 
sector; and technology and development.
The personnel requirements to perform these activities 
generate a "typical career pattern" for Bank staff members, 
characterized as to "enter research when young and then move off 
to Operations."
Even so, admittedly, "bureaucratic structure and management 
control," at the Bank, "are not entirely friendly to academic 
research.” Neither is "the Bank able to match the salaries that 
the best academics in North America and Europe earn." 
Specifically, in fields such as finance, the Bank "does not 
compete even at entry level."
Wide dissemination of research results, within and outside 
the Bank, is assured by several means: books published through 
university presses; journals on applied, policy-oriented 
development economics; an atlas, two sets of tables, as well as 
country briefs are issued to disseminate data; as well as the 
widely read World Development Report (WDR), based on research 
working papers.
Finally, a primary goal of these dissemination activities is 
described as "getting the results of Bank research to Operations 
staff," which demands "something more than sending draft research 
papers. . . or filling the week with research seminars."
Avowedly, "many research papers present methodological or 
statistical results effectively but stop short of showing how 
such results can be used to improve policy or project design." 
Thus, "often missing is a translation of research findings into 
operational recommendations."
VI. 5. THE IMF * S ANNUAL REPORT
(WDW/27/89 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1989)
In the annual report the Executive Board reviews the 
performance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during the 
financial year ending April 30. It is divided in two parts, the 
first examines the principal developments in the world economy 
during 1988-89, based on the staff's World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), originally published in april 1989 (WDW/12/89). An updated 
and forward-looking examination of the world economy will be 
available until the release of the second issue of the WEO, 
expected for October 1989.
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The second part constitutes the Report's c o r e ,  because it 
contains a detailed review of policies and activities, presented 
under the following five headings: surveillance; external debt 
situation and strategy; trade policy; support of adjustment 
programs; Fund-Bank collaboration; and financial operations and 
policies.
The activities performed under surveillance are described by 
groups of countries. Among the industrial countries, the members 
of the G-7 — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States—  are examined individually and 
separate sections deal with the developing countries and the 
newly industrializing economies.
Besides a congratulatory tone to signal positive events, 
such as "the healthy growth in industrial countries and the 
narrowing of trade imbalances among them," the Executive Board 
voices concern about the following aspects of the global economic 
situation: 1) in the developing countries, growth of output and 
investment is considered "inadequate;" 2) in the industrial 
countries, "fiscal deficits need to be reduced, and adjustment of 
external imbalances must be reinforced;" and 3) all countries 
"require vigorous structural reforms to reduce trade distortions 
and to improve efficiency."
On the external debt of developing countries the conclusion 
is mixed. It is recognized that "considerable progress has been 
made by a number of indebted countries," while in many others 
"debt problems continue to hamper stable economic growth."
Also, the following conditions are specified to obtain the 
Fund's support and participation in case-by-case operations of 
debt reduction: 1) a medium term adjustment program, including 
strong elements of structural reform; 2) "voluntary, market based 
operations" that contribute to regaining access to credit markets 
and achieve external payments viability with economic growth; and
3) "a determination that support for the reduction of debt and 
debt service represents an efficient use of scarce resources."
On trade policy, concern is voiced about the persistence of 
protectionist pressures, granting strong support to the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Out of a total of 46 ongoing adjustment programs, the Report 
reveals that 24 are new arrangements approved during the last 
financial year. The most recent revision of these operations 
indicates that there still is a need for: 1) appropriate program 
design and a strong commitment by national authorities; 2) 
protection of adjustment programs from external shocks; and 3) 
increased attention to the impact on income distribution and on 
the poorer segments of society.
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The difficulties experienced by member countries, during the 
eighties, generated greater overlap between the functions of the 
World Bank and those of the Fund. Thus, a new set of principles 
was approved "to promote closer collaboration" between both 
institutions (WDW/14/89).
Finally, a review of the Fund's operations indicates that:
1) commitments of Fund resources "increased substantially," by 
SDR 1.6 billion to SDR 4.6 billion; 2) drawings declined to SDR
1.9 billion from SDR 2.6 billion; 3) repayments were relatively 
large, amounting to SDR 6 billion; 4) the negative transfer of 
resources to the Fund remained approximately at the same level of 
the previous year, SDR 4 billion; 5) overdue obligations rose 
from SDR 2 billion to SDR 2.9 billion, of which SDR 2.8 billion 
was due from 11 members that were in arrears by six months or 
more; 6) holdings of usable ordinary resources stood at the "near 
record level" of SDR 42.9 billion; 7) finally, to perform these 
activities, in financial year 88-89, the Fund employed 1691 
persons and its administrative and capital expenses amounted to 
SDR 171.7 million, up from SDR 170.1 million in the previous 
year.
This brief overview reveals an institution endowed with 
plentiful resources to perform its catalytic role, at the center 
of most international financial rescue operations.
Nonetheless, the IMF's Managing Director has proposed a 
doubling of Fund quotas, if possible before the year ends. Mr. 
Camdessus has mentioned the following reasons to justify the 
proposal for a quota increase: 1) the Fund "must be kept at a 
credible size and should grow broadly in line with the size of 
the world economy;" 2) demands on the Fund's resources are 
"expected to be relatively high in the coming years;" 3) the 
Fund's reliance on borrowed resources should be reduced; and 4) 
the liquidity of the institution should be protected.
Even so, opposition to the quota increase is coming mainly 
from the United States, citing the buildup in IMF arrears and 
the "near-record" level in usable resources. Some opposition is 
expected as well from Great Britain, because a doubling of quotas 
will make it cede its number two spot in the IMF pecking order to 
Japan. Also, Saudi Arabia remains skeptical about the proposed 
size of the quota increase.
In these terms, the size of the quota increase promises to 
become one of the most controverted issues that will have to be 
tackled during the coming annual meetings, to be held next week 
in Washington.
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VI. 6. THE WORLD BANK'S ANNUAL REPORT 1989 
(WDW/28/89 - 27 SEPTEMBER 1989)
This year's Annual Report of the World Bank— covering the 
fiscal year from July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989—  is divided in 
seven sections: 1) the activities of the Bank's Executive Board;
2) a global perspective on the economic scene; 3) lending areas;
4) finances; 5) policies and operations; 6) finally, regional 
perspectives, containing a segment dedicated to Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
The world economic scene is described from the vantage point 
of the industrial and the developing countries. In 1988, the 
"global economy" is said to have "staged a strong performance." 
In the industrial countries GNP grew by 4 percent, while in the 
middle-income and low-income countries the corresponding figure 
was 5 percent.
Nonetheless, "these aggregates mask significant differences 
among country groups." While in the industrial economies strength 
was "broad-based," in developing countries "there were striking 
differences between fast-growing economies mostly in Asia, and 
the poor performance of the highly indebted, middle-income 
countries, largely in Latin America." As a result of this poor 
performance in highly indebted countries, the Report signals that 
"there was a growing general acceptance of the need to lessen the 
debt burdens of developing countries in order to improve their 
prospects for sustained growth."
The Bank's lending activities supported several "key areas." 
First, there was a greater focus on the reduction of poverty in 
country-assistance strategies. Second, a set of guidelines was 
approved to permit the Bank to support debt and debt-service 
reduction, with the first loans approved in June 1989, containing 
provisions for specific amounts of debt reduction. Third, the 
Special Program of Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa was expanded, 
bringing the number of countries assisted to twenty two. Fourth, 
environmental concerns were incorporated to policies and 
operations, with a third of all projects approved during the 
fiscal year containing significant environmental components and 
Environmental Issues Papers prepared for about 70 borrowing 
countries. Fifth, an action program was formulated to provide 
for an increased role of the private sector in the development 
process. Finally, the Bank's reserve position was strengthened, 
through an increase in the level of reserves and changes in the 
currency composition of reserves.
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In FY 1989, commitments by the Bank and the International 
Development Association (IDA), amounted to US $23.0 billion, 13 
percent higher than the previous year. Adjustment lending from 
both the Bank and IDA increased to $6.4 billion, up from $5.0 
billion in FY 1988. Also, lending for energy led all sectors by 
volume, amounting to $3.8 billion, followed by agriculture and 
rural development at $3.5 billion.
Combined IBRD and IDA lending to the poorest countries 
— those with per capita incomes of $480 or less—  increased to 
slightly more than $10 billion. In seventeen highly-indebted 
developing countries — Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Yugoslavia—  net disbursements amounted to $8.8 billion, while 
interest and charges amounted to $10.9 billion, leading to a 
negative transfer of resources from these countries to the Bank 
of almost $2.1 billion. This increase in the dollar value of 
repayments resulted from "amortization payments on a growing 
volume of outstanding debt, as well as the effects of 
exchange-rate adjustments on the currency pool used in Bank 
lending."
In the segment dedicated specifically to Latin America and 
the Caribbean it is said that economic growth has slowed, 
"further delaying the process of restoring per capita output." In 
1988 and early 1989, per capita GDP declined at an annual rate of
0.6 percent, with this decline accelerating in the first half of 
1989.
The Bank finds that in most Latin American countries, "the 
decline in output per capita has been accompanied by increases in 
export earnings and acceleration of inflation," with most of the 
trade surplus "used to pay interest on external debt, although 
some countries managed to accumulate international reserves."
Also, over the 1986-88 period, the net transfer from eight 
highly indebted countries — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela—  "amounted to 4.4 percent 
of GDP."
The Report's analysis of Latin American export earnings and 
resource transfers highlights three issues. First, "export 
earnings have increased enough to ease the foreign-exchange 
constraint." Second, "the trade surplus has been increasingly 
responding to domestic policies rather than to the availability 
of foreign capital and to debt-service strategies." And third, 
"debt reduction schemes have taken care of most of the private 
sector's long-term external debt and contributed to focus the 
debt problem on the capacity of the public sector to generate a 
surplus to service its debts." Consequently, "the public sector
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has effectively transferred resources to foreign creditors in an 
amount equivalent to 3 percent of GDP over 1986-88."
The most active borrower from the Bank in the last fiscal 
year was Mexico, $2.2 billion, followed by India, $2.1 billion, 
and Indonesia, $1.6 billion.
By sector, in Latin America and the Caribbean in FY 1989, 
non-project lending was the most important, amounting to almost 
$1.5 billion, followed by lending to development finance 
companies, $864 million, industry, $860 million, energy, $830 
million, and urban development, $675 million.
Finally, to perform these operations, the Bank's budget for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1989 amounted to $786.0 million, 
of which $535.0 for the Bank and $251.0 for IDA. In the present 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1990, the budget amounts to $899.6
million, of which $593.8 million for the Bank and $305.8 for IDA.
VI. 7. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE BANK-FUND ANNUAL MEETINGS 
(WDW/29/89 - 4 OCTOBER 1989)
By contrast with the Bank-Fund spring meetings (WDW/10/89), 
no single issue dominated the last annual meetings, held in 
Washington, from 22 to 28 September 1989.
Despite Hobart Rowen's dismissal, in The Washington Post as 
"an expensive and meaningless social event," several highlights 
can be identified. Although most of them took place offstage and 
have to be found behind the esoteric language of the communiques, 
as well as behind the technically restrained rhetoric of the 
formal speeches.
In a certain way, this confirms the foresight that something 
has to happen wherever 3,500 government delegates, 5,000 
financiers and 1,000 journalists gather to discuss the state of 
the world economy.
The main events were: 1) President Bush's meeting with the 
commercial bankers; 2) the strength of the dollar 3) the IMF's 
quota increase; 4) President Conable's emphasis on the 
environment and on defense expenditures; and 5) the separate 
announcement of a stand-by to Argentina and of an agreement 
between Venezuela and its commercial creditors.
The dollar's strength was addressed in the communique 
issued, on Saturday, September 23, by the Ministers of Finance 
and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Seven (G-7) — Canada, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
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Kingdom and the United States—  in the following terms: "the
Ministers and Governors considered the rise in recent months of 
the dollar inconsistent with long run economic fundamentals." 
Furthermore, "they agreed that a rise of the dollar above current 
levels or an excessive decline could adversely affect prospects 
for the world economy. In this context, they agreed to cooperate 
closely in exchange markets."
By Tuesday, September 26, the dollar obediently tumbled, 
although by the end of the week it became evident that something 
more than jawboning is going to be necessary to counter the 
strength of the dollar.
The IMF Managing Director mounted an intense campaign for a 
100% quota increase, with a view of accomplishing this goal at 
the most by year's end, Nonetheless, he confronted an important 
obstacle (WDW/27/89). The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. 
Nicholas Brady, in an address to the Interim Committee, stated 
that "a fully persuasive case has not been made that there is a 
pressing need for additional resources at this time." Also, 
Secretary Brady reminded that in previous statements he had 
emphasized that "a decision on quotas must be based on an agreed 
vision of the role of the Fund in the 1990s and on fundamental 
progress being made in resolving the arrears problem in order to 
strengthen the revolving, monetary character of the institution." 
This was interpreted as meaning that even when there is overall 
agreement about the quota increase, there remains to be decided 
the amount that will be acceptable to everybody.
In accordance with the new division of tasks agreed between 
the IMF and the World Bank (WDW/14/89), President Barber Conable 
underlined longer-term issues, such as the environment and the 
reduction of arms expenditures in developing countries.
Reacting to relentless pressure from environmental 
activists, as well as to certain apprehensions from developing 
countries, the communique of the Development Committee "noted 
that the integration of environmental considerations into 
development projects could result in increased costs as well as 
benefits and could require technological transfers to the 
developing countries."
Additionally, in an unprecedented statement, President 
Conable raised the issue of the reduction of military 
expenditures in developing countries. Mr. Conable noted that "as 
a group low-income countries allocate around 20 percent of 
central government budgets to defense." Also, these expenditures 
"exceeded spending on health and education combined," emphasizing 
that "the $200 billion which the developing world spends annually 
on the military has largely been protected" from pervasive budget 
cuts. Finally, Mr. Conable reminded an audience that habitually 
skirts around such issues, that "arms are often a prime source of
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external debt: military debt accounts for a third or more of 
total debt service in several large developing countries."
The other highlights of the meetings were in the realm of 
the indebtedness of developing countries. Among these, probably 
the most intriguing had to do with the role of the commercial 
banks in the debt strategy.
Rumblings were heard before the meetings indicating that a 
certain malaise existed among the commercial banks regarding 
their expected role in debt reduction operations, one of the 
central elements of the new debt strategy. Some of them were 
contained in the already traditional letter addressed to the 
Interim and Development Committees by the manager of the banks' 
advocate, the Institute of International Finance.
More to the point were previous decisions adopted by some of 
the big money-center banks, such as Chase and Manufacturers 
Hanover, increasing their loan loss reserves. The high point came 
when J. P. Morgan decided to add $ 2 billion to its loan loss 
reserves, increasing them to 70%, from 20%, of its total loans 
to developing countries.
This was immediately interpreted as an indication that these 
banks were unwilling to participate in new lending operations. It 
also made evident that a fracture had opened in the otherwise 
solid front presented by the commercial banks. Particularly 
because Citicorp's President John Reed had stated his preference 
for new lending, as an alternative to debt reduction.
The climax came when, in an "unprecedented effort," 
President Bush summoned leading bankers to the White House, to 
rally their support for the debt strategy. Such direct 
involvement by the U.S. President in the debt issue had never 
happened before. It was later interpreted, by Richard Feinberg, 
from the Overseas Development Council, as a manifestation of a 
"very unusual moment in international finance," by which "the 
U.S. Treasury in a Republican Administration is having a public 
spat with the money-center banks."
Finally, on the side of the debtors, there were two 
important events. First, after meeting President Bush at the 
White House, President Menem disclosed that agreement had been 
reached with the IMF for a $1.5 billion stand-by for Argentina. 
This stood in marked contrast with the Berlin annual meetings, 
when the World Bank announced that it had reached an agreement to 
lend to Argentina $1.25 billion, without previous agreement with 
the IMF. This time, the order was reversed.
The other event was the announcement by the Venezuelan 
government that it had dropped its demands of a 50% debt 
reduction and that agreement was near on a $600 million interim
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loan from the banks, enabling Venezuela to meet some of its 
arrears in interest payments. This was interpreted as a signal 
that negotiations could now begin on debt reduction, or as stated 
by the Minister of Planning of Venezuela, Mr. Miguel Rodriguez, 
"to create the atmosphere so the negotiating process could speed 
up. "
These few highlights illustrate how beyond the usual 
ritualistic manifestations, such as the constrained speech-making 
and the cryptic communiques, the annual Bank-Fund meetings 
constitute one of the main locus or decisions available within 
the process of international economic policy-making.
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